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ABSTRACT 
Critics of international arbitration predominantly invoke the concept 
of “fairness” in four ways.  First, fairness is associated with procedural due 
process concerns, involving the expected trade-off between party demands 
for efficiency and confidentiality in dispute resolution and in court 
litigation where there are expectations of full presentation and disclosure of 
evidence and transparency in the conduct of arbitration proceedings.  
Second, fairness is also used as a criterion for assessing dispute resolution 
outcomes, in regard to how arbitral tribunals choose their interpretive 
methodologies or retain subjective discretion when applying substantive 
law or rules to the given facts of a dispute.  Third, critics assert unfairness 
in pointing out the absence of full judicial review of arbitral awards with 
merely a limited recourse to appeal as the control mechanism in 
international arbitration.  Fourth, recent empirical attempts by scholars 
argue fairness synonymously with the legitimacy of community decision-
making and participation rights, where questions have arisen in regard to 
perceived inequalities in the appointment of arbitrators, the composition of 
arbitral tribunals, and the ability of arbitrators to resolve public interest 
dimensions attaching to international arbitration disputes.  These critiques 
stand alongside mandates of fairness already embedded in the operative 
rules of international arbitration, such as, for example, Article 18 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration (“all parties shall be treated with 
equality,”)1 Article 9(2)(g) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration (“considerations of procedural economy, 
proportionality, fairness or equality of the Parties”),2 and Article 1.7 of the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial contracts (“good faith 
and fair dealing in international arbitration”).3 
Responding to varying usages of “fairness” and in order to elicit 
testable criteria for future verification, this paper draws from Harvard 
philosopher John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness in his opus “A Theory 
of Justice.”  Rawlsian theory can substantiate the ongoing assessment of 
fairness in international arbitration through the theory’s approach to 
evaluating inequalities arising from political ordering and/or economic 
arrangements.  In the original position where individuals contract or reach 
                                                     
1  UNCITRAL, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. 
DOC. A/40/17, art. 18 (Jul. 7 2006). 
2  IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, Art. 
9(2)(g). 
3  UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Art. 1.7. 
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mutual agreement under a veil of ignorance as to each other’s relative 
endowments, information asymmetries, and welfare expectations, Rawls 
argues for reasonable conditions within which each contracting party can 
agree to principles best representing their interests.4  Under the first 
Rawlsian principle (the “liberty principle”), each contracting party should 
have the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with liberties for all parties contracting under the same 
arrangements.  Under the second Rawlsian principle, any social and 
economic inequalities arising from the agreement reached should attach 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity to all parties, and such 
inequalities should be distributed in a manner that they are to be of the 
greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of the bargaining 
community (the “difference principle”).  This paper applies Rawlsian 
fairness analysis to each of the four “fairness”-based critiques of 
international arbitration, finding ultimately that each asserted critique 
requires more careful differentiation as to perceived inequalities in 
arbitration procedures, communities, and outcomes. 
“ . . . fairness is relative and subjective . . . a human, subjective, 
contingent quality which merely captures in one word a process of 
discourse, reasoning, and negotiation leading, if successful, to an 
agreed formula located at a conceptual intersection between 
various plausible formulas for allocation . . . .  The fairness of 
international law, as of any other legal system, will be judged, first 
by the degree to which rules satisfy the participants’ expectations 
of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and secondly by the 
extent to which the rules are made and applied in accordance with 
what the participants perceive as right process.5 
 
                                                     
4   JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Revised Edition by Belknap Press of the 
original edition published by Harvard University Press, 1971), at 11-13. 
5  THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7, 22–
24 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995). 
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1. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, JUSTICE, AND FAIRNESS 
 
For some years now, international arbitration (especially 
investor-State arbitration) has been peculiarly “under siege.”6  
Despite the inimitable diversity of mechanisms for the settlement of 
international disputes and the respective functional limits of these 
mechanisms,7 it is with some irony that the oldest and most heavily-
used form of dispute settlement8 today attracts the most 
commentaries and questions as to its capacity to observe and to 
result in fairness.9  Despite canonical observations that 
                                                     
6  See, e.g., Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 Cornell Int’l L.J.l 603 
(2012) (discussing the effect of power on INCSID arbitration and its challenges); Pia 
Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet., Profiting from Injustice:  How Law Firms, Arbitrators and 
Financiers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom (Corporate Europe 
Observatory and Transnational Institute 2012) (arguing that international 
arbitration has created an international investment climate that is flawed); Steven 
Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses its Grip:  Are U.S. lawyers to blame?, A.B.A. 
J. (2010) (asserting that U.S. lawyers may be the cause of the ineffectiveness of 
international arbitration); Lucy Reed, More on Corporate Criticism of International 
Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG,  (July 16, 2010), available at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/07/16/more-on-corporate-
criticism-of-international-arbitration/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (proposing 
solutions to the asserted problems in international arbitration). 
7  W. Michael Reisman, The Diversity of Contemporary International Dispute 
Resolution:  Functions and Policies, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, 47, 47–63 (2013) 
(explaining the control systems of international arbitration).  
8  CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2006) (describing the framework of 
international arbitration).  On ancient or pre-modern arbitrations, see SHEILA L. 
AGER, INTERSTATE ARBITRATIONS IN THE GREEK WORLD, 337-90 B.C. 3–36 (Univ. of 
California Press 1996) (recounting the structure of interstate arbitration in Ancient 
Greece); JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO 
LOCARNO 153–89 (Lawbook Exchange 2004) (describing arbitration from ancient 
times until the Jay Treaty of 1794). 
9  David Ma, A BIT Unfair?  An Illustration of the Backlash Against International 
Arbitration in Latin America, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 571 (2012) (outlining the history and 
developing of proposed problematic bilateral investment treaties in Latin 
American); MICHAEL WAIBEL, ET AL., THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION:  PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY  (Wolters Kluwer 2010) (describing the 
development of the criticism of international arbitration); Stavros Brekoulakis, 
Systemic Bias and International Arbitration: a New Approach to Arbitral Decision-
Making, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 553 (2013) (asserting approaches to assist in 
solving the problems of international arbitration).  On the tradeoff between fairness 
and efficiency in arbitration, see William W. Park, The Procedural Soft Law of 
International Arbitration: Non-Governmental Instruments, in LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & 
JULIAN D.M. LEW (EDS.), PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 141–54 
(Kluwer Law Int’l 2006).  
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“international arbitration is widely perceived as an inherently fair 
process,”10 present challenges against the “fairness” of international 
arbitration stem from criticism of its evidentiary procedures, the 
veracity and reliability of the arbitral decision-making process, as 
well as the substantive outcomes resulting from this mode of 
dispute resolution.11 
 
1.1. Recontextualizing objectives of international arbitration vis-à-vis 
international adjudication 
 
However, the measure of “fairness” does require some 
contextualization about the actual nature of international 
arbitration.  Among international dispute resolution mechanisms, 
arbitration has an established pedigree (dating back to ancient 
arbitrations in Greece to the origins of modern arbitration in the 1794 
Jay Treaty)12 and scope (encompassing interstate as well as mixed 
arbitrations, on virtually every conceivable subject-matter from 
                                                     
Fairness, however, can implicate the additional time and cost sometimes 
needed to provide a meaningful right to be heard.  In arbitration, fairness 
requires some measure of efficiency, since justice too long delayed 
becomes justice denied.  Likewise, without fairness an arbitral proceeding 
would hardly be efficient, since it would fail to deliver a key element of 
the desired product: a sense of justice that had been respected. 
10  Robert Pietrowski, Evidence in International Arbitration, 22 ARBITRATION INT’L 
373, 379 (2006) (“. . . the increasing use of international arbitration, coupled with the 
relative infrequency of challenges of arbitral awards, suggests that in fact 
international arbitration is widely perceived as an inherently fair process . . . .”).   
11  See Nana Japaridze, Fair Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice 
with Preserving the Nature of International Commercial Arbitration, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
4 1415 (2008) (describing proposed conflicts and problems in international 
arbitration). 
12  On ancient or pre-modern arbitrations, see SHEILA L. AGER, INTERSTATE 
ARBITRATIONS IN THE GREEK WORLD, 337-90 B.C. 3-36 (Univ. of California Press, 1996) 
(describing the procedure of interstate arbitration in Ancient Greece); JACKSON H. 
RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 153-89 (Lawbook 
Exchange 2004) (describing general international arbitration in the Ancient World); 
see also JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 32 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) 
(describing the early history of international arbitration in the United States); David 
W. Rivkin, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Rule of Law: The 2012 Clayton 
Utz/University of Sydney International Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARBITRATION INT’L  327-
60 (LCIA 2013) (explaining the current proposed problems of international law). 
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border delimitations to economic disputes).13  Arbitration is distinct 
among other international dispute resolution mechanisms for its 
emphasis on party autonomy, the core principle that allows 
disputing parties to determine the applicable law governing the 
merits of a dispute, which they consent to submit to arbitrators that 
are also freely appointed by the parties themselves.14  Unlike 
international adjudication that has a predetermined institutional 
design and pre-existing governing rules,15 parties to an international 
arbitration have greater latitude to structure fact-finding 
procedures, evidence-taking, identification of issues, and other 
aspects of the conduct of the arbitration in order to reach the most 
expedient resolution of the dispute to the satisfaction of the parties.16  
The inherent flexibility of the international arbitral process and its 
overall utility in producing binding and enforceable arbitral awards, 
help explain the enduring popularity of international arbitration as 
                                                     
13  See Diane A. Desierto, Is Arbitration a Form of International Justice?, Academie 
du droit de l’arbitrage, available at http://www.arbitrationacademy. org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Diane-Desierto.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) 
(proposing that international arbitration is not a form of justice). 
14  EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE (EDS.), FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, AND 
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 785 (Kluwer Law Int’l 
1999) [hereinafter “FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, AND GOLDMAN”] (criticizing the process 
of allowing both parties to determine the applicable law in international 
arbitration). 
15  See GERNOT BIEHLER, PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 278-80 (Springer 
2008) (outlining the strengths of international arbitration); Cesare PR Romano, et 
al., Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, The Issues, and Players, in CESARE 
ROMANO, ET AL., (EDS.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 3–
25 (Oxford Univ. Press,2013).  
Judicial bodies (also generically referred to as ‘courts’ or ‘tribunals’) pre-
exist the question that is to be decided.  The adjudicators are selected, 
elected, or nominated through a mechanism that does not depend on the 
will of the litigating parties.  They sit on the body’s bench and decide a 
series of cases.  The judge’s authority derives from a public mandate and 
the outcome is, in essence, a ‘public good’.  Conversely, in arbitration, the 
adjudicators are selected by the parties after the dispute arises, with the 
aim of deciding a particular case.  The arbitral tribunal or panel is 
dismissed after issuing the decision (known as the ‘award’).  Since the 
parties select the members of arbitral bodies, the mandate of arbitrators is 
circumscribed to administering ‘private justice.’ 
16  See SHARYN L. ROACH ANLEU, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 137-38 (Sage 
Publishing 2009) (discussing the sociological informalism of international 
arbitration); TONY COLE, THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION xvi (Routledge 
2013) (“The essential difference between the straightforward anarchy of public 
international law, then, and the bounded anarchy of international investment law, 
is the combination in the latter of a predesigned procedural structure and a 
substantive anarchy that exists within the boundaries set by that structure.”). 
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global corporate counsels’ preferred dispute resolution mechanism. 
For instance, “frequent users of arbitration explained that, 
regardless of whether they are claimant or respondent, ‘fairness’—
above all other considerations—is what companies look for in a 
dispute resolution mechanism . . . arbitration, because of its 
neutrality, gives a sense of fairness that litigation in foreign courts 
sometimes cannot provide.”17  Parties to an international arbitration 
remain primarily concerned with the resolution of a concrete 
dispute, under a fair process supported at narrow and specific 
junctures by the exercise of the State’s public power, rather than 
triggering sweeping State oversight and control as is characteristic 
of court litigation.18 
These fundamental ontological differences make it clear that 
there can be no assumed identity between the community 
expectations19 attaching to international adjudication, and those 
                                                     
17  Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry Perspectives, SCHOOL OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, CENTRE FOR COMMERCIAL LAW, QUEEN MARY 
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, 6–7, available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-
dispute-resolution/assets/pwc-international-arbitration-study.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2014). 
18  W. Michael Reisman, Recueil Des Cours:  Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law, 258 RECUEIL DES COURS 39-40 (1996).  
Insofar as a legal system enables legal actors to conclude a private contract 
with respect to future behaviour, it should encounter no theoretical 
problem with allowing those actors to designate someone else to specify, 
under procedures and on contingencies agreed upon in the contract, 
certain obligations that will be deemed, in advance, to be part of the 
contract . . . the critical factor in the operation of arbitration, as in contracts, 
is the commitment and effectiveness of the legal system with respect to 
supporting, assisting and, where necessary, enforcing arbitral agreements 
and their results . . . though private arbitration is a non-governmental 
mode of dispute resolution, it cannot operate without the active support 
of governmental agencies.  That support is a mixture of tolerance, 
encouragement, protection of its autonomy and supervision, for 
arbitration, like any other form of delegated power, is susceptible to moral 
hazard. 
19  Community expectations are drawn from the constituencies that seek 
recourse to dispute resolution, availing of international adjudication (such as States 
submitting disputes to the International Court of Justice), vis-à-vis international 
arbitration (such as States engaged in inter-State arbitrations, individuals and 
corporate entities engaged in commercial arbitrations with fellow private actors or 
mixed arbitrations with States).  See Myres S. McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: 
A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 NAT. L. F. 53, 55 (1956). 
For us, as law students, the most important general question is:  How does 
one identify authoritative and controlling rules?  In more detail, who in 
any given community prescribes what rules, with respect to what values, 
for whom, and by what procedures?  Who makes effective 
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maintained for international arbitration.20  While both mechanisms 
are designed to resolve disputes, parties choosing to resort to either 
international adjudication or international arbitration ultimately 
demonstrate their revealed preferences on applicable law and 
procedural rules, the quality of institutional oversight, the degree of 
transparency or confidentiality expected in the conduct of 
proceedings, as well as the operative systems of control that affect 
the authoritative decision-makers in any given dispute.21  As such, 
while one may readily claim that the functionalist objective of every 
dispute resolution mechanism is to achieve a “just result” under a 
“fair process,”22 it should also be clear that the manifold ways to 
reach that objective under international arbitration would not 
necessarily be the same as those available under international 
                                                     
recommendations to such authoritative prescribers and upon what 
intelligence, achieved by whom and by what procedures?  Who, 
authorized how, may invoke the application of what prescriptions, with 
respect to whom, in what arenas?  Who, for the promotion of what 
policies, applies what prescriptions to whom, by what procedures?  Who 
appraises prescriptions and terminates them when they cease to serve 
community purposes?  By what factors in environments and 
predispositions of decision-makers are all the various types of decisions 
above affected?  What is the impact of community process, culture, class, 
personality, skill, affiliation, crisis, and so on, upon the expectations of 
decision-makers? 
20  See William W. Park, Arbitration’s Protean Nature:  The Value of Rules and the 
Risk of Discretion, 334-91, 335, in JULIAN D.M. LEW & LOUKAS A. MISTELIS (EDS.), 
ARBITRATION INSIGHTS:  TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Kluwer Law Int’l 2007) (“Like a bespoke tailor, the 
creative arbitrator cuts the procedural cloth to fit the particularities of each contest, 
rather than forcing all cases into the type of ill-fitting-off-the-rack litigation garment 
found in national courts.”). 
21  See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION:  BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 2-3 (Duke Univ. Press 
1992).  
Controls are a virtual prerequisite for international third-party decision.  
When we deal with optional international decision processes, that is those 
in which, for the most part, participation is voluntary and in which the 
expectation of the operation of the control mechanism may be an 
important factor in decisions opting to use a particular process, an actual 
or anticipated control breakdown such this is likely to induce many actors 
henceforth to refrain from using the process.  Thus controls in 
international adjudication and arbitration are not simply conditions of 
efficient operation.  They are conditions of operation. 
22  In the words of Lord Bingham, “[m]eans must be provided for resolving, 
without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the 
parties themselves are unable to resolve.”  See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 66 
(Penguin Books 2011). 
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adjudication. 
It is crucial to stress this differentiation at the outset, because the 
critiques on the seeming “unfairness” of international arbitration 
apparently arise from expectations wed to a more judicial or 
structurally adjudicative paradigm of international dispute 
resolution.  When critics seek “more procedural due process” 
reforms for international arbitration,23 in reality they advocate a 
notion of procedural due process that is more closely analogous to 
how the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence is observed 
in traditional court proceedings.24  By urging  more document 
production and far-reaching discovery procedures, more compelled 
disclosures of evidence, increased third party-participation, a more 
extensive presentation of witnesses under stricter admissibility 
rules, as somehow all axiomatic descriptors of “procedural due 
process,” it is clear that the effort is less towards “reforming” 
international arbitration than it is to ultimately “transform” it into 
international adjudication.25 
                                                     
23  See David C. Sawyer, Revising the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules:  Seeking 
Procedural Due Process Under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules for Arbitration, 1 INT’L COM. 
ARB. BRIEF 24, 25-26 (2011)(“Two of the most important concerns underlying the 
protection of procedural due process when creating arbitration rules are that the 
rules give participants a sense that the proceedings have been unbiased and that 
they have thus produced a fair and enforceable award.”). 
24  See MATTI S. KURKELA & SANTTU TURUNEN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1–2 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).  
. . . a fundamental feature of arbitration is that the arbitral award . . . is a 
final and binding determination of the parties’ rights and obligations.  
Arbitral awards are widely enforceable, including internationally.  Thus 
the States delegate jurisdictional power to arbitral tribunals indirectly 
through agreement of the parties.  With this delegation of power comes a 
type of trade-off in the form of standards of quality applicable to 
arbitration.  Making certain the award is enforceable is one of the most 
central duties of the arbitral tribunal.  If the arbitral tribunal wants to issue 
an enforceable award, the process has to meet certain quality standards.  
These minimum quality standards are, of course, procedural.  They can be 
called due process requirements just like the minimum standards in 
ordinary court procedure.  In the same way, they establish the minimum 
procedural safeguards necessary for someone to be deprived of his 
property or other rights.  As such, they can be considered aspects of such 
elements as procedural fairness, opportunity to be heard, and equal 
treatment as well as access to justice. 
25  See Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International 
Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 COLUM. J.  TRANSNAT’L 
L. 923, 926 (2002-2003) (stating that international arbitration is designed to benefit 
from an efficient and neutral adjudicating proceeding.) By “international 
adjudication,” I still refer to the conventional understanding of the International 
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Such veiled attempts to transform international arbitration into 
international adjudication appear perplexing, given that one of the 
foremost objectives behind designing international arbitration was 
precisely to avoid the costs and inefficiencies of court-based 
litigation.26  On the other hand, the attempts to introduce more 
judicial paradigms of procedure, control and oversight into 
investor-State arbitration, while often debated, are at least more 
understandable when one considers the State interests implicated in 
foreign investment disputes between investors (who notably may be 
purely private commercial actors, or parastatal entities such as State-
owned or controlled enterprises) and host States (operating directly 
or through sub-state contracting entities27).28  In this latter situation 
                                                     
Court of Justice as a court seized of general jurisdiction to adjudicate any question 
of international law.  Recent scholarship generally designates “international 
adjudication” as encompassing a “second-generation” of international tribunals, 
but for purposes of this Article I still differentiate between the jurisdictional 
mechanisms operative for international litigation before the ICJ (e.g. 
compromissory clauses, special agreements under the Art. 40 of the ICJ Statute, 
Optional Clause declarations, forum prorogatum), as opposed to consent to 
arbitration (usually through the arbitral agreement or arbitral clause in an 
agreement or national legislation that makes an offer of arbitration) deemed 
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in institutionally-administered or ad hoc international 
arbitrations.  See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61(4) 
DUKE L. J. 775, 775-879 (2012). 
26  W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 
AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 46 (1992) (“One of the major objectives 
of international commercial arbitration has been to keep dispute resolution out of 
the courts of one or the other of the parties and to protect litigants from the costs of 
plodding through the long corridors of national judicial bureaucracies, with 
mandatory calls at each successive cubicle to rehear all or parts of the case.”); GARY 
B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, VOLUME I 71 (2009) (“While far 
from perfect, international arbitration is, rightly, regarded as generally suffering 
fewer ills than litigation of international disputes in national courts and as offering 
more workable opportunities for remedying or avoiding those ills which do exist.”). 
27  On the attribution of private conduct to host States, see JAN OLE VOSS, THE 
IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN HOST STATES AND FOREIGN 
INVESTORS 139-48 (2010). 
28  See R. Doak Bishop and Margrete Stevens, A Systemic Perspective of the 
Foreign Investment Dispute Settlement System:  Feedback, Adaptation, and Stability, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION:  THE 
FORDHAM PAPERS 25, 56-57 (2011). 
The investment dispute system was “designed” to arbitrate single, 
isolated cases before ad hoc tribunals, in a generally confidential manner, 
with limited review, and international law obligations of compliance and 
enforceability . . . . [T]he system was not originally intended to generate a 
body of decisional jurisprudence, much less a consistent body of decisions.  
Instead, its characteristics are consistent with the general nature of 
arbitration and the “one-off” nature of particular cases . . . .  [A] review of 
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when a State enters into a foreign investment contract with the 
investor, the choice of a dispute settlement mechanism – whether 
more “privatized” as traditionally understood in international 
arbitration, or more “public” or “judicial” as associated with court-
based litigation – inimitably becomes one that affects both the 
“public interests”29 of the State as well as the commercial 
expectations and interests of the private actor. 
 
1.2. Fairness critiques against international arbitration 
 
Accordingly, if one were to map the spectrum of types of 
international arbitrations according to the degree of State 
involvement (from purely private international commercial 
arbitrations, to mixed arbitrations involving a private party and a 
State, all the way to inter-State arbitrations), it should be easy to 
visualize that the more contracting parties appear “private” (or de-
linked from the State), the greater the expectations parties may 
harbor for sufficient autonomy to flexibly design a “bespoke” 
dispute resolution mechanism.30  Conversely, one might expect a 
more marked preference for dispute resolution paradigms or 
procedures that are closer to the degree of State oversight and 
                                                     
the formal design of the system does not reveal the whole story.  Because 
of the proliferation of investment treaties in which states consent to 
arbitrate a broader range of disputes than is typical under contracts, and 
the public nature of such disputes, a tension has developed between the 
private and public natures of such dispute settlement. 
29  “Public interest” does not necessarily rule out a priori the State’s commercial 
or economic interest in the investment transaction.  I subscribe to the definition of 
“public interest” as “[i]n a particular context, the public interest refers to the 
outcomes best serving the long-run survival and well-being of a social collective 
construed as a [‘]public[’].”  See BARRY BOZEMAN, PUBLIC VALUES AND PUBLIC 
INTEREST:  COUNTERBALANCING ECONOMIC INDIVIDUALISM 12 (2007) (alternation in 
original) (discussing the contextual nature of defining what the public interest is). 
30  See MICHAEL MCILWRATH AND JOHN SAVAGE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
AND MEDIATION:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE 95-102 (2010) (showing that parties examine 
considerations of neutrality, enforcement, efficiency, cost, flexibility, competence, 
convenience, confidentiality, and moderation in choosing international arbitration 
over court litigation); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 3, 8-14 (2012) (enumerating reasons or objectives of international 
arbitration such as neutrality, centralized dispute resolution, enforceability of 
agreements and awards, commercial competence and expertise, finality of 
decisions, party autonomy and procedural flexibility, cost and speed, 
confidentiality and privacy of dispute resolution). 
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control associated with court-based litigation or international 
adjudication, whenever a State is directly or indirectly (as in the case 
of parastatal entities or state-owned and controlled enterprises31) 
involved as a contracting party in the dispute.32  Community 
expectations behind fairness in international arbitration should thus 
be situated within its actual objectives or limitations as a dispute 
resolution mechanism.  If expectations based on more “judicial” 
paradigms or court-based litigation were to be imposed on 
international arbitration, it should be stressed that such 
expectations, in the first place, ipso facto seek to transform this 
mechanism well away from its actual teleological design.33 
Recognizing the foregoing clarifications, “fairness” critiques in 
regard to international arbitration can be framed according to four 
predominant categories.  First, the fairness of international 
arbitration has been questioned on the basis of procedural due 
process (or “arbitrariness”34) considerations, essentially challenging 
                                                     
31  See JONATHAN G.S. KOPPELL, THE POLITICS OF QUASI-GOVERNMENT:  HYBRID 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL 18 (2003) (“. . .state-
owned enterprises are clearly products and instruments of public policy.”). 
32  See Hilde Caroli Casavola, Global Rules for Public Procurement, in ROZEN 
NOGUELLOU AND ULRICH STELKENS (EDS.), COMPARATIVE LAW ON PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
27, 32 (2010).  
Public procurement therefore constitutes one of the areas in which 
economic globalization is causing an increase in transnational litigation.  
The mechanisms employed and the supranational bodies appointed to 
settle such litigation (often exclusively) are steadily increasing . . . .   
[However] [a]nother factor contributing to the erosion of the national 
judges’ monopoly on dispute resolution involving public contracts is the 
fact that states prefer to solve problems regarding public contracts by way 
of arbitration.  It has been perceptively observed that the national judges 
in a contracting body’s country hear a case involving international 
procedures not so much by virtue of existing supranational rules as 
because of the fact that the dispute has been, as it were, “abandoned” to 
their jurisdiction by the other contracting party. 
33  On the functional considerations for choosing between international 
litigation and arbitration for international project financing contracts, in particular, 
see Michael Nolan, Julian Stait, and Erin Culbertson, Dispute Resolution in Project 
Finance Transactions, in JOHN DEWAR (ED.), INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE:  LAW 
AND PRACTICE 419, 419-62 (2011).  There has been some opposition to permitting 
international arbitration to mutate into a judicial system.  See GEORGIOS I. ZEKOS, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND MARINE ARBITRATION 489 (2008), at p. 489 
(“[A]rbitration cannot become an alternative court system, a system of public justice 
outsourced to private providers but an alternative dispute system co-equal to 
courts administered by the state and keeping its classical advantages of speed, cost 
effectiveness and efficiency, leading to justice and satisfaction.”). 
34  JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 98 (2013). 
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supposedly prohibitive levels of costs, policies of confidentiality, 
and the principles of evidentiary fact-finding adopted in arbitral 
proceedings.35  Second, fairness has also been associated with the 
assessment of the actual outcomes of a dispute, given arbitrators’ 
non-uniform (and at times, perceptibly idiosyncratic36) interpretive 
                                                     
[I]t may be wise to recognize that arbitrariness is, in reality, a type of 
failure of due process; the supervising court should not censure arbitration 
because it finds itself in substantive disagreement with them, no matter 
how acute, but because their reasons do not reveal a proper hearing of the 
parties...and thus seem to be the product of an otherwise inexplicable 
preference for a particular outcome. 
35  JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 675 (2003) (footnote omitted) (alteration 
in original).  
Procedural irregularity amounts to violation of the principle of fairness.... 
It is essential that certain minimum standards are observed and that 
arbitration proceedings are conducted fairly.  Failure to disclose 
documents may not amount to a serious irregularity justifying challenge 
of an award.  Undoubtedly proper notice of the appointment of arbitrators 
or notice of the arbitration proceedings are expressions of fairness; so is 
also the opportunity of each party to present its case and respond to the 
case put forward by the other party. 
See also William W. Park, Two Faces of Progress:  Fairness and Flexibility in Arbitral 
Procedure, 23(3) ARB. INT’L 499, 499-503 (2007) (discussing two provisions in the 
context of English arbitration law that while one affords arbitrator substantial 
discretion in procedural matters, the other offers the arbitral awards to be 
challenged for serious irregularity and thus assures fairness.); NATHAN D. 
O’MALLEY, RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  AN ANNOTATED 
GUIDE 292 (2012).  
When applying an evidentiary privilege, it is not uncommon that an 
“equal treatment” and fairness issue may come about.  The problem arises 
in connection with the application of different rules of privilege to the 
parties.  If, for example, a tribunal uses a private international law analysis 
to determine that one rule of privilege applies to Party A’s communication 
and a different rule to Party B’s, it is effectively applying different 
standards between the parties. 
36  Tony Cole, Authority and Contemporary International Arbitration, 70(3) La. L. 
Rev. 801, 805 (2010).  
[T]he procedural innovations that have been adopted to adapt arbitration 
to the new contexts in which it now occurs have not been effectively 
designed to provide parties with any reason to accept the award 
delivered.... [C]ontemporary international arbitration simply no longer 
functions properly as a means of genuinely resolving disputes and is 
instead increasingly coming to represent merely a legal game, invoked by 
the parties due to the enforceability of its awards rather than because the 
system produces desirable results. 
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methodologies for reaching reasoned decisions.37  Third, fairness 
has also been depicted as a tradeoff ensuing from observing the 
principle of finality in international arbitration, which traditionally 
affords only very limited recourse to appeal as a control 
mechanism.38  Finally, the fairness of international arbitration has 
been challenged on the basis of the legitimacy of decision-making 
arising from the largely unregulated composition of the “arbitral 
elite,”39 as well as the limited rights of participation available to third 
                                                     
37  See Shari Seidman Diamond, Psychological Aspects of Dispute Resolution:  
Issues for International Arbitration, in ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED.), INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 328, 329 (2003) 
(“[E]ven when actual outcomes were held constant and even when those outcomes 
were negative, the perceived fairness of the procedures strongly influenced the 
party’s satisfaction with the verdict and willingness to accept the legitimacy of the 
decision.”); Larry A. DiMatteo, Soft Law and the Principle of Fair and Equitable 
Decision-Making in International Contract Arbitration, 1(2) CHINESE J.  COMP. L. 221, 
221-55 (2013); Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional 
Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 Stan. J. Int’l L. 53, 69-71 (2005); 
Leonardo Graffi, The Law Applicable to the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement: A 
Practitioner’s View, in FRANCO FERRARI AND STEFAN KRÖLL (EDS.), CONFLICT OF LAWS 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 19, 49 (2010) (“[A]rbitrators are more accustomed to 
specific international arbitration tools (for example, the comparative law method, 
international law or the conflict of laws theories), than many domestic courts that 
usually deal with purely domestic matters.”); William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields 
Lecture – Arbitration’s Protean Nature:  The Value of Rules and the Risks of Discretion, 
19(3) ARB. INT’L 279, 279-301 (2003). 
38  Rowan Platt, The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration:  
Fairness over Finality?, 30(5) J. INT’L ARB. 531, 532-33 (2013); Noemi Gal-Or, The 
Concept of Appeal in International Dispute Settlement, 19(1) EUR. J. INT’L L. 43, 43-65 
(2008); Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 
44(4) NYU J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1109, 1109-1204 (2012); William H. Knull, III & Noah D. 
Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration:  Is It Time To Offer An Appeal 
Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 531 (2000). 
39  JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
273.  See also Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, available at 
http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-
workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12 (finding that the arbitrators’ 
decision are somehow influenced by their appointing parties); Gus Van Harten, 
Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication:  An Empirical Study of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 50(1) OSGOODE HALL L. J. 211, 211-68 (2012); Christopher R. 
Drazohal & Richard W. Naimark, Commentary, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 147, 156 (Christopher 
R. Drazohal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) (footnote omitted) (“Is international 
arbitration dominated by a small group of elite counsel and arbitrators?  Some refer 
to an international arbitration “‘mafia’ or a ‘club’,” but Jan Paulsson asserts that 
such characterizations “lack a solid evidentiary basis.””)   For contrasting views, see 
Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 
at 504-13 (2006); Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor:  Exploring 
Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, at 79-88 (2010). 
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parties asserting public interests in the international arbitration.40 
 
1.3. Rawls’ Theory of Justice as Fairness:  Criteria for Assessing 
Fairness in Understanding “Universal Arbitration” as a 
Sociological Phenomenon 
 
This Article does not purport to directly engage each of the 
foregoing four categories of predominant critiques of fairness in 
international arbitration.  Rather, it invites a reassessment of the 
conceptual use of “fairness” as the underlying criterion deployed in 
each of these critiques.  As an evaluative measure, “fairness” may 
have an elusive meaning but it is not without identifiable 
parameters. While “fairness” and “justice” could be viewed as 
objectives or end values of international arbitration,41 when cast in 
the four predominant categories of critique abovementioned these 
objectives are often seen as inevitable tradeoffs.42  This Article 
recognizes such a potential tradeoff or distributive inequality 
                                                     
40  Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in 
International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121, 121 (2003); Eugenia Levine, 
Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration:  The Implications of an Increase 
in Third-Party Participation, 29(1) BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 200, 200-24 (2011); Yusuf 
Caliskan, Dispute Settlement in International Investment Law, in IMPLEMENTING 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THROUGH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 123, 
146-52 (Yusuf Aksar ed., 2011) (on the gradual development of amicus curiae 
participation in investment arbitration jurisprudence); Tomoko Ishikawa, Third 
Party Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 373, 373-
412 (2010); but see, Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International 
Arbitration, 8 NEV. L. J. 341, 345 (2007) (“[A]s a result of its history and the ethos of 
its participants, as well as the pragmatic necessities around which it is constructed, 
the international arbitration system appears to have a more public-oriented 
approach to the process of resolving disputes.”). 
41  HORACIO A. GRIGERA NAÓN, CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 289 (“International arbitrations have to be therefore 
based on a choice-of-law methodology enabling them to pursue objectives of 
fairness and justice compatible with the specific modalities of justice which 
arbitrators should advance.”). 
42  MATTI S. KURKELA & SANTTU TURUNEN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 205 (2nd ed. 2010). 
Does fairness increase costs?  Possibly sometimes.  In addition, increasing 
costs limits access to arbitration and to justice and thus reduces the 
fairness of the proceedings.  Just as the above examples show, if and when 
conflicts between fairness on the one hand and finality, efficiency, 
flexibility, efficiency or timeliness on the other exist, they really need not 
be discussed at a general level, but should rather be dealt with case by case 
when a need for balancing appears. 
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arising from choices made by parties in designing an international 
arbitration, but instead proposes to scrutinize the consequences of 
any resulting inequalities from these design choices.  Using 
philosopher John Rawls’ famous theory of “Justice as Fairness” as 
criteria for parties seeking to reach agreement and distribute any 
inequalities resulting from such agreement,43 I seek to examine the 
actual potency of the four predominant critiques of unfairness in 
international arbitration. 
Admittedly, Rawls conceptualized his theory of justice 
primarily from the prism of social cooperation, where principles of 
social justice “provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the 
basic institutions of society . . . and . . . define the appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.”44  
Society is deemed to be “well ordered when it is not only designed 
to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively 
regulated by a public conception of justice . . . [which constitutes] 
the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association.”45  
Rawls saw justice as the “first virtue of social institutions,”46 an end 
result that occurs “when no arbitrary distinctions are made between 
persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the 
rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the 
advantages of social life.”47  While Rawls hesitated to apply his 
conception of justice to the “fairness of voluntary cooperative 
arrangements or procedures for making contractual agreements,”48 
                                                     
43  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-53 (1971). 
44  Id. at 4.  
45  Id. at 4-5. 
46  Id. at 3. 
47  Id. at 5. 
48  Id. at 8. While Rawls conducted his thought experiment under autarkic 
assumptions of a “closed system isolated from other societies,” he merely 
dissembled on the possible use of his theory for purely private contracts and saw 
no conflict with applying his definition of justice to “traditional” justice involving 
individual actions and entitlements:   
These principles may not work for the rules and practices of private 
associations or for those of less comprehensive social groups.  They may 
be irrelevant for the various informal conventions and customs of 
everyday life; they may not elucidate the justice, or perhaps better, the 
fairness of voluntary cooperative arrangements or procedures for making 
contractual agreements . . . .  I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate 
a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society 
conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other 
societies . . . . [T]his definition is framed to apply to actions, and persons 
are thought to be just insofar as they have, as one of the permanent 
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there is nothing that bars the extension of his theory to international 
arbitration. As with the orginal Rawlsian paradigms, international 
arbitration is also a set of social arrangements otherwise “viewed as 
a body of norms sufficiently organized, complete, and effective to 
qualify as a system,”49 distinguished by various features of social 
cooperation, such as:  1) “the existence of an extensive body of rules 
generated at an international level and governing various aspects of 
international arbitration[;]”50 2) the “increasing uniformization of 
arbitral proceedings,” the “universal[] character and source of rules 
that apply in international arbitration[;]”51 and 3) the fact of 
“international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism” that is 
heavily used by parties around the world.52  As a form of dispute 
resolution, international arbitration as supported by States through 
narrow judicial controls and oversight, should be seen as just as 
much a product of “rational selection where actors select those 
institutions that are most effective and appropriate for given 
disputes.”53  There is thus no conceivable reason why Rawls’ 
paradigm of fairness in arrangements for social cooperation (albeit 
theorized by Rawls at a greater societal level of abstraction), cannot 
be conceptually applied to assessing the fairness of arrangements 
that parties (States and non-State parties) jointly choose when 
deciding to submit their dispute to international arbitration.54 
                                                     
elements of their character, a steady and effective desire to act justly . . . . 
[S]uch entitlements are, I believe, very often derived from social 
institutions and the legitimate expectations to which they give rise . . . . 
The definition I adopt ...[has] no conflict with the traditional notion.  
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). 
49  Emmanuel Gaillard, The Emerging System of International Arbitration: 
Defining “System”, 106 ASIL PROC. 287, 287-92 (2012). 
50  Id. at 288. 
51  Id. at 288-89. 
52  Id. at 289. 
53  Walter Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy:  From Litigation to 
Arbitration, 55(4) INT’L ORG. 919, 921-47 (2001).  
54  Indeed, I am certainly not the first to suggest that Rawls’ theory of justice 
as fairness may be applied to international arbitration.  See ANITA ALIBEKOVA & 
ROBERT CARROW, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION - FROM THE 
PROFESSIONAL’S PERSPECTIVE 297 (Lulu.com, 2007).  
Rawls’ theory was intended for and limited to the problem of determining 
social justice for a given society . . . . He himself noted, however, that his 
theory of justice could be extended to actions within the society, including 
how to determine the content of its laws, its institutions, the decisions and 
judgments of its courts, and the attitudes of its persons. 
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The four predominant categories of critiques of fairness in 
international arbitration are, themselves, inherently sociological in 
nature, drawing upon bedrock conceptions of fairness often left 
obscure (or merely assumed) in such critiques.  This Article attempts 
a preliminary disentanglement of the concept of fairness in the 
examination of international arbitration as a “sociological 
phenomenon,”55 as well as of international arbitrators as members 
of a professional “vocation.”56 Jan Paulsson has lent the term 
“universal arbitration” to describe this convergence of dispute 
resolution with decreasing linguistic and cultural barriers, owing to 
shared legal foundations and sources as well as “inclusive” methods 
of governance and intellectual infrastructures spanning the globe.57  
From his standpoint, “universal arbitration” appears as a 
mechanism for “international cooperation”58 – and in this manner, 
takes us to precisely the very same question of constitutive social 
arrangements to which Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness does 
provide some answers. 
 
 
                                                     
William W. Park, Rectitude in International Arbitration, 27(3) ARB. INT’L 473, 508 
(2011) (footnote omitted). 
Soft law instruments thus represent one check on the imperial decision-
maker, and perhaps the only standard that can permit elaboration of 
procedural law through what John Rawls called the ‘veil of ignorance’ 
about the contingencies of a rule’s application. Arbitrators who interpret 
preexisting norms have less leeway to pick rules that will lead to the 
outcome favoured by their subjective predispositions. 
Robert L.C. Houston, ‘Justice as Fairness’ as a Guiding Principle in Arbitration, ABA 
SEC. LITIG. (Nov. 12, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/ 
commercial/articles/fall2012-1112-justice-fairness-guiding-arbitration.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
55 Aleksander Goldstajn, Choice of International Arbitrators, Arbitral Tribunals, 
and Centres:  Legal and Sociological Aspects, 27, 32, in PETAR ŠARČEVIC.(ED.), ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Martinus Nijhoff, 1989). 
56  Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 957, 957-1020 (2005). 
57  Jan Paulsson, The Alexander Lecture: Universal Arbitration – What We Gain, 
What We Lose, CHARTERED INST. ARB. (Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/jan_Paulsson_
Universal_Arbitration_-_what_we_gain_what_we_lose.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015). 
58  See id. at 10-14 (elaborating on “international cooperation” as a necessary 
component to saving the world and on legitimate adjudication as a necessary piece 
to achieving such cooperation). 
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2. APPLYING RAWLS’ JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS CRITERIA TO FAIRNESS-
BASED CRITIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
2.1. Rawlsian Theory:  Criteria for Reaching Agreement and 
Distributing Inequalities 
 
In the initial “bargaining” position (the state in which parties 
mutually decide on cooperative arrangements), Rawls maintains 
that the “principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance”59 
between “rational and mutually disinterested”60 parties who 
respectively possess different entitlements (such as resources, 
endowments, skills) and asymmetric information about the other’s 
entitlements at the time of bargaining.  In this original position, 
Rawls posits that the parties would agree to the operation of two 
basic principles:  “the first requires equality in the assignment of 
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and 
economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and 
authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for 
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of 
society.”61  For Rawls, the reason behind this allocation of 
inequalities is that social cooperation can only be best achieved if 
everyone participates in the scheme of cooperation, even those less 
well-situated in the initial bargaining position.  Thus, what is crucial 
to ensuring everyone’s participation in social cooperation is to 
guarantee that the agreement for social cooperation is reached only 
under “reasonable terms” which ultimately nullify “the accidents of 
natural endowment and the contingencies of social 
circumstances.”62  Rawls concedes that his theory of justice as 
fairness is an example of “contract theory” and the “theory of 
rational choice”:  the content of the relevant agreement between the 
parties is “not to enter a given society or to adopt a given form of 
government, but to accept certain moral principles . . . that would be 
chosen by rational persons . . . deal[ing] with conflicting claims upon 
the advantages won by social cooperation.”63  The contracting or 
bargaining process has a “practical aim,” which is “to reach 
                                                     
59  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 12. 
60  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 13. 
61  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 14-15. 
62  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 15. 
63  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 16. 
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reasonably reliable agreement in judgment in order to provide a 
common conception of justice.”64  As a result of setting reasonable 
terms for bargaining (and taking into account each party’s veil of 
ignorance as to the other party’s natural endowments and 
entitlements), the parties should ultimately converge on a 
conception of justice acceptable to both of them:   
[s]ince it is up to persons in the original position to choose 
these principles, it is for them to decide how simple or 
complex they want the moral facts to be.  The original 
agreement settles how far they are prepared to compromise 
and to simplify in order to establish the priority rules 
necessary for a common conception of justice.65   
However, it is important to stress that the process of setting terms 
for agreement is in no way amoral; the theory of justice as fairness 
creates inbuilt constraints on bargaining between parties based on 
the understanding of what is right for social cooperation, and not 
just maximizing what is good individually for the bargaining 
parties: 
Justice as fairness is a deontological theory . . . [p]ersons 
accept in advance a principle of equal liberty and they do this 
without a knowledge of their more particular ends.  They 
implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conceptions of 
their good to what the principles of justice require, or at least 
not to press claims which directly violate them . . . .  The 
principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which 
satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what 
are reasonable conceptions of one’s good.  In drawing up 
plans and in deciding on aspirations men are to take these 
constraints into account . . . .  [Parties’] desires and 
aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of 
justice which specify the boundaries that men’s systems of 
ends must respect . . . in justice as fairness the concept to right 
is prior to that of the good.  A just social system defines the 
scope within which individuals must develop their aims, 
and it provides a framework of rights and opportunities and 
the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which 
                                                     
64  RAWLS, supra note 43, 44-45. 
65  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 45. 
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these ends may be equitably pursued.66   
Given the foregoing understanding of the initial bargaining 
situation between parties seeking to reach agreement on social 
cooperation, Rawls then prescribes two principles of justice: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar scheme of liberties for others.  Second: social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and 
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.67 
The liberties to be equally enjoyed by the bargaining parties 
under the First Principle include political liberties, freedom of 
speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, 
as well as the “right to hold personal property and freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of 
law.”68  The Second Principle (otherwise known as the Difference 
Principle) recognizes that the distribution of wealth and income 
need not be equal but that it must be to everyone’s advantage:  
“[o]ne applies the second principle by holding positions open, and 
then, subject to this constraint, arranges social and economic 
inequalities so that everyone benefits.”69  Accordingly, injustice 
would mean “simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.”70  
Not only should there be reasonable terms for reaching mutually 
acceptable agreements for social cooperation, but that bargaining 
parties must enjoy equal liberties in the process of bargaining.  
Should there be any inequality arising from the ultimate agreement 
reached, this inequality must be allocated away from the party most 
disadvantaged in the bargaining process.  The following section 
applies these features of Rawls’ Justice as Fairness criteria to the four 
predominant categories of fairness-based critique against 
international arbitration. 
 
 
 
                                                     
66  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 30-31. 
67  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 53. 
68  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 53. 
69  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 53. 
70  RAWLS, supra note 43, at 54. 
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2.2. Testing Critiques of International Arbitration Under Rawlsian 
Fairness 
 
As discussed in Part I, charges of “unfairness” against 
international arbitration rarely clarify the conceptual bases for the 
understanding of “fairness.”  For arbitration to be “fair,” for 
example, a number of “essential requirements” have been 
suggested,71 such as the existence of a “bona fide difference”72 or 
dispute between the parties, with parties having “an equal right to 
participate in choosing their arbitrator.”73  The “absence of bias” by 
the arbitrators has also been deemed to be a “critical component of 
procedural equilibrium” as understood in common law systems.74  
Other scholars maintain that the arbitral tribunal should observe 
certain standards of fairness in the conduct of proceedings,75 such as 
giving proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator and of the 
conduct of proceedings, as well as ensuring in the conduct of the 
arbitration that parties have genuinely meaningful opportunities to 
be heard and to present their respective cases.76  These 
considerations of equality “cannot be reduced to a mathematical 
formula . . . and [are] instead informed by the circumstances of the 
case.”77  Lacking a comprehensive or overriding definition of 
fairness, it would be more plausible to test understandings of 
“fairness” as used in critiques against international arbitration.  For 
this purpose, I apply Rawls’ Justice as Fairness criteria (specifically 
the First Principle, also known as the Liberty Principle, and the 
Second Principle, also known as the Difference Principle) to re-
                                                     
71  Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell, The Commercial Way to Justice, in LIBER 
AMICORUM ERIC BERGSTEN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION 231-50 (Stefan Kröll, et 
al. eds., 2011). 
72  Id. at 234. 
73  Id. at 235. 
74  SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL   
ARBITRATION:  THE NEED FOR A ‘REAL DANGER’ TEST 30 (2009). 
75  See William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 805, 822-823 (1999) (suggesting that the United States adopt an act that 
will outline protective review standards for international arbitration in order to 
ensure fairness). 
76  Loukas Mistelis & Domenico Di Pietro, Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), in CONCISE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1, 17 (Loukas A. Mistelis ed., 2010). 
77  MARTIN F. GUSY ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE ICDR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
RULES 172 (2011).  
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examine these critiques of “unfairness” in international arbitration.  
As the succeeding subsections will show, Rawlsian “fairness” 
criteria would, at times, support the charge of unfairness in some 
aspects of the critique, while contradict the charge in others. 
 
2.2.1.  Critique of unfairness based on procedural due process 
 
As discussed in Part I, claims of unfairness against international 
arbitration based on procedural due process usually emanate from 
stronger expectations of transparency in the conduct of arbitral 
proceedings,78 as well as a clamor for more extensive evidentiary 
fact-finding or discovery procedure analogous to court-based 
litigation.79  These concerns are often based on “public interest”80 or 
public policy considerations, and are somewhat unusual for 
arbitrators to consider when their evidentiary rulings traditionally 
ought to be “mindful of the legitimate expectations of the parties,” 
whose mutual consent, in the first place, is the basis of the arbitral 
mandate.81  Arbitral tribunals, after all, also function as “regulators” 
of the conduct of legal counsels and are inimitably tasked with 
                                                     
78  See Cyrus Benson, Can Professional Ethics Wait? The Need for Transparency in 
International Arbitration, 3 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 78, 78-94 (2009) (proposing a checklist 
to ensure fairness and transparency in international arbitration). 
79  See LEW, supra note 35, at 675 (insisting on the need for procedural regularity 
in order to ensure fairness). 
80  See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, The Public Interest in International Arbitration, 106 AM. 
SOC’Y OF INT’L L. PROC. 300, 302 (2012), which states: 
 [I]n other words, if the presence of public interest is the test of a type of 
arbitration that must be segregated from private commercial arbitration, 
we must go back at least a century, and redraw all of our maps.  
 
 There is no analytical line to be drawn around arbitration created by 
treaty. It is impossible to resist the impression that the line being proposed 
is in fact a battle line, a meretricious taxonomy intended to justify an 
agenda which ought to step out of the shadows. Perhaps the core of all this 
is the idea that international disputes involving matters of public interest 
should only be entrusted to bodies comprised of international civil 
servants or persons directly appointed by states, or (as has been 
suggested) that all awards arising out of investment- treaty arbitrations 
should be subject to an appellate body before which the only disputants 
will be states—and any temporarily victorious private party would be left 
with the timorous hope that its own foreign ministry will feel that it is in 
its government’s interest to defend the initial award. 
81  Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary Privileges in International 
Arbitration, 50 INT’L AND COMP. L. Q. 345, 385 (2001). 
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safeguarding the fair conduct of arbitral proceedings.82 
 Noticeably, the demand for greater transparency finds more 
resonance in investor-State treaty arbitration. The recent approval of 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitration (“UNCITRAL Transparency Rules”) augurs a 
policy favoring extensive document disclosures and broad public 
access to information about investor-State arbitrations.83  In 
approving the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, the UN General 
Assembly stressed that it recognized “the need for provisions on 
transparency in the settlement of such treaty-based investor-State 
disputes to take account of the public interest involved in such 
arbitrations,” and believed that such rules “would contribute 
significantly to the establishment of a harmonized legal framework 
for a fair and efficient settlement of international investment 
disputes, increase transparency and accountability and promote 
good governance.”84  The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules mandate 
that arbitral tribunals “shall take into account: (a) The public interest 
in transparency in treaty-based investor-State arbitration and in the 
particular arbitral proceedings; and (b) The disputing parties’ 
interest in a fair and efficient resolution of their dispute.”85 
Applying Rawls’ theory of Justice as Fairness, it is important to 
first differentiate the “original positions” subsisting between parties 
to international arbitration.  These, I submit, will not necessarily be 
the same for parties to an international commercial arbitration, as 
opposed to parties to an investor-State arbitration or an inter-State 
international arbitration.  When private commercial parties 
negotiate an arbitral agreement or arbitral clause in their contracts, 
they do so under a situation of some asymmetric information as to 
each other’s relative resources, capabilities, and pre-bargaining 
endowments.  Applying the First Principle (the Liberty Principle), 
both parties can be deemed to possess equal basic liberties in the 
bargaining process, as seen from the governing principles of party 
                                                     
82  See R. Doak Bishop & Margrete Stevens, Safeguarding the Fair Conduct of 
Proceedings – Report, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  THE COMING OF A NEW AGE?, 
ICCA CONGRESS SERIES VOL. 17 473–95 (Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed., 
2013)(describing who may be accurately described as a regulator of an international 
arbitration). 
83  UNCITRAL, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 68/109, U.N. 
DOC. A/68/462 (Dec. 16, 2013) available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf. 
84  Id. at paras. 5–6. 
85  Id. at paras., 4(a)–(b). 
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autonomy and freedom to consent in arbitration.86  It is also possible 
to comply with the Second Principle (the Difference Principle) and 
allocate any ensuing social and economic inequalities to the least 
advantaged party.  On the one hand, parties can authorize 
arbitrators in advance to rule on the dispute as amiable compositeur  
(permitting the arbitrator to rule ex aequo et bono or in equity), 
enabling the parties to authorize the tribunal in advance to prioritize 
considerations of equity rather than strict legal formalism.87  On the 
other hand, arbitral tribunals themselves could derive authority 
from the general rule of arbitration that “the parties shall be treated 
with equality,”88 to allocate any social or economic inequalities 
potentially arising from the agreement to submit the dispute to 
                                                     
86  See Michael Pryles, Limits to Party Autonomy in Arbitral Procedure, 
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Apr. 15, 2009), 
http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12223895489410/limits_to_party_autonomy_in_international_c
ommercial_arbitration.pdf (discussing party autonomy as a basic principle 
involving their freedom to agree on procedures to be followed in an international 
commercial arbitration);  and ANDREA M. STEINGRUBER, CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, paras. 2.04–2.06 (2012), which states in relevant part: 
Party autonomy is the primary source of arbitration jurisdiction and 
procedure.  Indeed the first and foremost principle of law in commercial 
arbitration is that it is founded on the autonomy of the parties’ will.  The 
crucial difference between arbitration and courts thus lies in the fact that 
the basis of the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is the will of the parties, 
while courts owe their competence to the procedural norms of a State or 
of an international convention....In arbitration the freedom of contract, as 
the primary rule that governs the law, practice, and regulation of 
arbitration in the vast majority of national jurisdictions, allows the parties 
to write their own rules of arbitration—indeed, it permits them to have the 
agreement to establish the law of arbitration for that particular transaction: 
the parties can customize the arbitral process to fit their needs, eliminate 
legal rules or trial techniques that might prove inconvenient or unsuitable, 
and maintain procedural elements they believe necessary to achieve 
fairness, finality, and functionality. 
87  FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, AND GOLDMAN, at p. 23.  See UNCITRAL, Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. DOC. A/40/17, art. 28(3) (Jul. 7 2006) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law] (stating that “the arbitral tribunal shall decide 
ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized 
it to do so.”); id. at Art. 28(3) (“In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in 
accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of 
the trade applicable to the transaction.”) [hereafter, “UNCITRAL Model Law”]. 
88  UNCITRAL Model Law, at art. 18.  See also UNCITRAL Model Law, at Art. 
15(1) (“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in 
such manner as it considers appropriate, provided the parties are treated with equality and 
that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of 
presenting his case.”) (emphasis added). 
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arbitration.89  This could be illustrated by the residual power of the 
arbitral tribunal to fill any procedural lacunae in a way that ensures 
parties have the opportunity to present their respective cases.90 
The original position in the ‘bargaining’ process in international 
investment arbitration is markedly different.  The offer of arbitration 
in these types of disputes may be made through the foreign 
investment contract (negotiated between the investor and the host 
State), the foreign investment treaty (negotiated between the home 
State of the investor and the host State), or the host State’s domestic 
legislation.91  Applying the First Principle (Liberty Principle), it 
                                                     
89  One scholar views the equality of parties as a fundamental part of 
fairness mandated under “transnational procedural public policy.”  See 
Fernando Mantilla Serrano, Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy, 20 
ARB. INT’L 4 333, 335 (2004): 
A survey of the sources of arbitral procedure shows that a transnational 
procedural public policy has indeed evolved, and that its baseline is 
relatively undemanding, comprising the fairness or equality principle that is 
embodied in the most basic notions of natural justice or due process.  As one 
prominent arbitrator has commented, ‘Modern arbitration laws have 
reduced [mandatory rules of law regarding the arbitral procedure] to very 
few such as that the parties shall be treated with equality and that each 
party shall be given an appropriate opportunity of presenting its case’ . . . 
.  [T]he first source of the parameters of the arbitral procedure is anything 
but transnational; it is as particular and private as the parties themselves, 
for ‘[w]ithout the agreement of the parties to submit to arbitration, there 
is no arbitral procedure’.  Accordingly, the most significant decisions the 
parties make regarding procedure are their choice of arbitral institution 
and arbitrator(s).  The major international institutions provide that the 
parties and the arbitral tribunal have relative freedom to establish the 
arbitral procedure, subject to certain provisos.  These provisos can be 
summarized as equal treatment of the parties by the arbitral tribunal and an 
opportunity for each party to present its case. (emphasis added). 
90  See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, Art. 
9(4) (“The Arbitral Tribunal may, where appropriate, make necessary 
arrangements to permit evidence to be presented or considered subject to suitable 
confidentiality protection.”); and ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER,, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 90-91 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th 
ed., 2004) (“It is true that the parties to international commercial arbitration will 
generally (but not always) have a set of procedural rules to follow, whether they 
are those of an arbitral institution or formulated ad hoc.  It is also true that the 
arbitral tribunal will generally (but not always) have the power to fill any gaps in these 
rules by giving procedural directions; and this set of rules, whether agreed by the 
parties or laid down by the arbitral tribunal, may perhaps be said to constitute ‘the 
law of the arbitration’ in the same way as a contract may be said to constitute ‘the 
law of the parties’ . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
91  See Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 830-67 (Peter Muchlinski et al., eds., Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2008) (detailing the different methods of enforcing consent).   
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should be evident that the parties to the investment treaty 
arbitration do not possess equal liberties during the bargaining 
process.  In investment arbitration based on bilateral investment 
treaties or other forms of international investment agreements, 
investors are not part of the bargaining process at the outset.  Rather, 
as third-party beneficiaries to the investment treaty,92 investors are 
simply assigned (after fulfillment of certain nationality and 
jurisdiction ratione materiae requirements) what would ordinarily 
have been the home State’s exclusive right of recourse to arbitration 
against the host State. 
While home States and host States presumably negotiate arbitral 
clauses in investment treaties in good faith and on equal footing, the 
types of negotiation leverage (and incentives to negotiate) employed 
are hardly the same for capital-importing States as for capital-
exporting States.93  As third-party beneficiaries of the dispute 
settlement mechanism provided for in international investment 
treaties, investors do not directly assume obligations under these 
treaties unless explicitly provided for in the treaty language.94 
                                                     
92  See Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of 
State Responsibility, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 617, 620 (2013) 
(detailing the transition from state regulation to investor regulation). 
93  See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Convergence or Complementarity?, 12 SANTA CLARA 
J. IN’T L. 65, 67 (2014) (discussing agreements between a capital-exporting state and 
a capital-importing state). 
94  See Thomas W. Wälde, Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation 
and Investment Disputes, YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
POLICY 507, 540-41 (2008) 
Host countries have the option to rely less on domestic law and 
enforcement (under their control) if they want to set up and enforce 
foreign investor obligations, in which case they can conclude specific 
investment contracts and include an international arbitral jurisdiction. 
That strategy—which has at times been pursued by governments—is 
often the preferred format for contracts between state enterprises and 
foreign investors. There is no reason why specific investment agreements 
should not also incorporate—”contractualize”—international treaty 
obligations. Such specific investment agreements can, and at times do, 
contain both state-addressed and investor-addressed obligations. Specific 
investment contracts have long provided an instrument of investment 
protection that in effect “contractualizes” obligations otherwise found in 
an investment treaty. The advantage for a government in using the form 
of an investment contract is the option to replace national courts by an 
international arbitral tribunal. Although it has often considerable control 
over national courts, its judgments are rarely enforceable abroad. With an 
arbitral tribunal it would gain in enforceability what it loses in political 
influence. But, to my knowledge, governments have not chosen to “load” 
investment contracts with the type of sustainable development and 
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Investors are admittedly not part of the initial bargaining 
process leading to the adoption of the arbitral clause or dispute 
settlement mechanism provided for in international investment 
treaties.  Accordingly, should investors seek to avail of the benefit of 
investment treaty arbitration they are, in the first place, already 
bound to accept the procedural rules that form part of the treaty’s 
pre-designated dispute settlement mechanism (such as the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules or the arbitral institution’s procedural rules for 
non-ICSID arbitrations), and usually without having taken on any 
substantive treaty obligations towards the host State.95  
Nevertheless, any resultant inequalities impacting upon procedural 
due process in the investment arbitration, could, applying the 
Second Principle (the Difference Principle), be somewhat 
ameliorated by the investment arbitral tribunal’s residual power to 
fill gaps as to procedure:  “[i]f any question of procedure arises 
which is not covered by this Section [of the ICSID Convention] or 
the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal 
shall decide the question.”96  Investment arbitral tribunals have 
invoked this residual power as the legal basis for procedural orders 
governing the conduct of proceedings, albeit only for narrow 
purposes of gap filling when there is no explicitly applicable rule 
under the ICSID Convention or the ICSID Arbitration Rules.97 
                                                     
human rights obligations Western NGOs advocate. But governments are 
perfectly free to do so; they can, for example, “contractualize” with access 
to international arbitration the mostly open-ended and non-ratified 
environmental and human rights treaties or soft-law instruments 
available. The main reason why governments so far seem not to choose to 
“internationalize” investment agreements by incorporating modern soft-
law, environmental, and human rights standards is that they prefer 
control and therefore prefer their own system of justice. 
95  See Judith Levine, Navigating the Parallel Universe of Investor-State Arbitrations 
under the UNCITRAL Rules, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 369-408 (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
96  ICSID Convention, Art. 44.  See also ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 19 (“The 
Tribunal shall make the orders required for the conduct of the proceeding.”). 
97  The famous example of a procedural order predicated on Article 44 of the 
ICSID Convention is the permission granted to suitable parties making amicus brief 
submissions, as seen in Suez and Ors v. Argentina, Order in Response to a Petition 
by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to make an Amicus 
Curiae Submission, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 12 Feb. 2007, para. 2, and Order 
in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 
May 2005, para. 17.  For an example of an arbitral tribunal declining to apply Article 
44 of the ICSID Convention, see Churchill Public Mining Company v. Indonesia, 
Procedural Order No. 2, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, 5 Feb. 2013, para. 21. Article 
44 does not confer unlimited discretionary powers to the Tribunal. Article 44 
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Taking the above differences in the context of two charges of 
perceived unfairness based on procedural due process in 
international arbitration – e.g. the supposed lack of transparency 
and the demand for more extensive fact-finding procedures – I 
submit that the application of Rawlsian fairness criteria would yield 
a result that does not completely concur with the charge of 
unfairness for all kinds of international arbitration.  For example, the 
charge of unfairness for lack of transparency does not appear well 
supported in international commercial arbitration, where parties 
possess virtually the same basic liberties (e.g. party autonomy) in 
negotiating or bargaining the arbitral agreement, and the arbitral 
tribunal is empowered to fill procedural lacunae ensure parties the 
opportunity to present their cases.  By contrast, however, the charge 
of unfairness for lack of transparency in investment arbitration may 
carry more traction, since, as previously discussed, parties to the 
arbitration (investors and host States) do not stand in terms of 
equality during the bargaining process that led to the formulation of 
the arbitral clause or agreement to submit disputes to arbitration 
contained within the investment treaty. 
More crucially, however, the charge of unfairness for lack of 
transparency is anchored on the argument that the interests 
involved in investment arbitrations are not merely limited to those 
of investors and host States, but also public sector constituencies of 
host States.98  While the host State presumably represented the 
                                                     
provides that “[i]f any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this 
Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall 
decide the question” (emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 20(2) of the Arbitration 
Rules requires that the Tribunal “shall apply any agreement between the parties on 
procedural matters” as long as it does not conflict with the Convention or the 
Administrative and Financial Regulations. Both these provisions show that the 
Tribunal must generally defer to the Parties’ agreements on procedural matters. 
ICSID Convention, Art. 44, supra note 96. 
98  See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 721, 756 (Peter 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer, eds., Oxford University 
Press, 2008) (“The involvement of the State as a party in international investment 
arbitrations has led to the erosion of the principles of privacy and confidentiality. 
As noted in the introduction, this is primarily due to the recognition that these cases 
involve important public interests. In some cases, it is the mere presence of the State 
or a State entity that gives rise to the need for transparency. In other cases, it is the 
subject-matter, the issues at stake, the political situation in the host State, or the 
amount of potential financial liability that gives rise to questions of public interest 
or public concern and thus, the need for transparency.”); Julie A. Maupin, 
Transparency in International Investment Law:  the Good, the Bad, the Murky, in 
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142, 148 (Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters 
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interests of these constituencies at the time of the negotiation of the 
bilateral investment treaty or international investment agreement, it 
is also conceivable that the host State’s political majority (or 
governing administration) that negotiated the agreement may not, 
subsequently, be the same political majority by the time investor-
State dispute arises which affects those same public sector 
constituencies.  For this reason, the latter may well object to who 
represents the host State at the time the arbitration commences.99  
Admittedly, this particular eventuality remains unaddressed within 
the confines of international investment arbitration rules, which 
remains primarily a self-contained set of procedures to which both 
home States of investors and host States bestow consent.  Thus, to 
the extent that certain public sector constituencies or interest groups 
cannot be deemed strictly or technically parties to the investment 
arbitration, there remains merely a narrow mode for articulating 
such interests through (still heavily debated) amicus submissions of 
non-disputing parties.100 
Assuming such public sector constituencies or interest groups 
could even be deemed to be separate and distinct parties (apart from 
home States of investors, and the host States of these public sector 
constituencies) in the bargaining process in regard to the arbitral 
clause in the investment treaty,101 then applying Rawls’ First 
Principle (Liberty Principle) they should also be entitled to the same 
equal basic liberties as the other parties.  Under Rawls’ Second 
                                                     
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2013) (“...any investigation of transparency in 
international investment law must pay heed to the many different forms and faces 
it can take.  It must also devote sufficient attention to the individuals and groups 
whose joint and separate activities are shaping the system’s trajectory.”). 
99  On issues of legal representation of host States, see Sebastien Manciaux, The 
Representation of States before ICSID Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT, NO. 1, 2011, 
at 87-96 (examining how problems relating to the representation of a state can be 
dealt with by curing the lack of authority of the person purporting to act on behalf 
of the state). 
100  See Charles H. Brower, Obstacles and Pathways to the Consideration of the 
Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes, Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 2008-2009, 
2009, at 347, 354; and Katia Fach Gomez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in 
International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public 
Interest, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L. J., 2012, at 510 (arguing for an improvement or 
complete termination of the current scheme). 
101  This proposition is admittedly a slippery slope.  Treaties remain 
instruments concluded between States, and binding upon these States, regardless 
of any internal law that may be asserted by the State later to justify non-
performance or non-observance of treaty obligations. See Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Art. 2 & 27 (May 23, 1969) (defining “treaty”). 
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Principle (Difference Principle) any ensuing social and economic 
inequality arising from the bargain reached in the investment treaty 
must be allocated away from the party that is most disadvantaged. 
Even accepting that there could be such a triage of implied and 
actual ‘parties’ to the investment treaty – the home State of the 
investor, the host State, and public interest groups asserting the 
inability of the host State to genuinely represent their interests – it is 
not always readily identifiable which party is the most 
disadvantaged.  The main difficulty with the charge of unfairness 
for lack of transparency of investment treaty arbitrations is that the 
groups or constituencies claiming such “rights” to information and 
disclosure are generally, in international law, deemed represented 
by their respective States (home State or host State) that concluded 
the investment treaty.  The clamor for transparency arises when 
such groups take the view that their host State did not adequately 
consult them when the investment agreements were concluded.102 
Under such a situation, it is not clear if the remedy for redressing 
this particular inequality (as asserted by certain constituencies 
within the host State) lies with reconfiguring the international social 
cooperation mechanism altogether (e.g. compelling these groups’ 
participation in the dispute settlement mechanism created under the 
international investment treaty concluded by the home State of the 
investor and the host State), or by simply leaving it to the internal 
accountability mechanisms of the host State to ensure that these 
groups are sufficiently and satisfactorily consulted as regards the 
impact of these investment treaties on their particular interests.  
Rawls’ Justice as Fairness criteria would, at the very least, require 
clarification as to the identity of the parties seeking to reach 
agreement (e.g. home States and host States, or also public interest 
groups acting independently from these States), before mandating 
                                                     
102  Although it still remains an open question whether a State, in signing such 
an agreement, genuinely consulted its citizens and acted in the “public interest.” 
VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 49 (Routledge, ed., 2012) 
[A]s the signature of investment agreements is the faculty of the executive 
power of the contracting states, the question arises as to whether national 
constituencies have been duly taken into account.  The procedure may lack 
parliamentarian control and long-term consequences and restrictions on 
policy spaces may not be adequately scrutinized by policy makers.  In 
many instances, the treaties appear to have been drafted with insufficient 
forethought by the executive branch, and without useful safeguards, 
exceptions, and limitations. 
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that all such parties enjoy equal liberties (the First Principle) and that 
any ensuing social and economic inequalities be allocated to the 
party least disadvantaged. 
 Finally, with regard to the issue of potentially expanding fact-
finding and discovery procedures coextensive as those in court 
litigation proceedings, one can likewise observe differences in the 
application of Rawlsian criteria.  In the “original position” for 
private parties bargaining the arbitral agreement in international 
commercial arbitration, as well as for States concluding the arbitral 
clause within their international investment agreements, it is quite 
obvious that “consent implies choice”103 - these parties already pre-
contracted and pre-committed themselves to a chosen set of 
procedures to govern their dispute in any ensuing arbitration,104 that 
changing the scope of fact-finding and discovery procedures 
midstream would certainly contravene the expectations of the 
parties. 
Applying the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle), if 
more extensive fact-finding and discovery rules are to be put in 
place, in order to meet the requirements of fairness, all parties 
consenting to the arbitration should possess equal liberties in regard 
to the approval and implementation of such rules.  Even in the case 
of international investment arbitration where other groups claim to 
represent the public interest more than the actual host State, because 
of the fundamental significance of all parties’ voluntary submission 
or consent to the arbitration to the intrinsic validity and legitimacy 
of this mode of dispute settlement,105 it remains crucial that the 
                                                     
103  SIMON GREENBERG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN 
ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE 23 (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
104  GARY B. BORN, Disclosure and Evidence-Taking in International Arbitration, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  LAW AND PRACTICE 177, 177 (Gary B. Born ed.,, 2012). 
105  See V.V. Veeder, Introduction to Investment Treaty Arbitration and Commercial 
Arbitration:  Are They Different Ball Games?, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION:  ICCA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 91, 91-92 (Albert Jan 
Van Den Berg ed., Kluwer Law Int’l, ICCA Congress Series 14, 2009) 
There are distinct challenges for practitioners and arbitrators in 
conducting a treaty-based arbitration involving a state as compared to an 
international commercial arbitration involving private parties only.  For 
example, what are the different strategic and tactical choices for the legal 
practitioner advising the investor or the state?  And what different 
problems await the unwary, beginning with the choice of arbitral 
procedure, the forum, waiting-periods, the selection of arbitrators, the 
pursuit of contract-based claims (as distinct from a breach of treaty), the 
resort to domestic courts, the exhaustion of local remedies, the distinctions 
between jurisdiction, admissibility, liability, causation and quantum, 
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consent of the actual parties to the arbitration be obtained before 
changes to the fact-finding and discovery rules are to be put in place.  
Even assuming that an arbitral tribunal imposes more extensive 
fact-finding and discovery procedures over the explicit objection of 
any party to the arbitration,106 I would still submit that, applying the 
Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference Principle), the party that 
appears most disadvantaged by the recommended procedural 
changes (or for whom legal costs would correspondingly increase to 
meet the altered fact-finding and discovery rules) should, at a 
minimum, not be made to bear the costs of increased document 
production demands, requests for interrogatories, and additional 
                                                     
together with all the practical issues involving a state as a party, including 
legal representation, document production, interim measures, 
counterclaims, testimony by officials etc.  The list is almost endless. 
106  See JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 869—70 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2012)  
Article 9.2(g) of the IBA Rules of Evidence 2010 allows for exclusion of 
evidence on the basis of procedural economy and proportionality as well 
as fairness and/or equality of the parties where these considerations are 
considered to be compelling.  This reaffirms the overall need to promote 
fairness and efficiency and contemplates that trade-offs will at times need 
to be made.  It also overlaps heavily with the criterion of an unreasonable 
burden and contemplates that the balancing exercise will take into account 
the circumstances of both parties.  By bolstering the entitlement of a 
tribunal to promote efficiency of evidentiary material, this should be an 
added barrier to claims of lack of due process where restrictions are 
imposed, at least where the parties have selected these Rules.  Having said 
that, parties are always entitled to make such claims and the requirement 
that the consideration be ‘compelling’ does not give much assistance 
where clearly material evidence is excluded by a tribunal not wishing to 
review voluminous documentation. Furthermore, the criterion also calls 
for fairness and equality, which in many cases will be the basis of a due 
process type determination.  An example is equalizing rules of privilege 
where parties come from legal systems with very differing perspectives. 
The concept of ‘procedural economy’ may also be uncertain and lead to 
inconsistent applications. A number of other factors would also be 
relevant to the exercise of the discretion to direct production of 
documents.  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler suggests consideration of the 
origin and expectations of the parties, which would include their 
familiarity with discovery rights, whether they would have expected 
disclosure when they entered into the arbitration agreement or conversely, 
whether this would be a shock to them. Another approach to the exercise 
of discretions is to seek to ensure that the time and expense of production 
is proportional to the anticipated usefulness, although as William Park 
points out, such a cost/benefit analysis will in part depend on what one 
perceives discovery to normally be used for. As noted above, it is also hard 
to apply as a test before all other evidence is heard and considered. 
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hearings, among others.107  In the case of non-disputing parties to 
investment arbitration (who arguably assert some degree of 
representation of the host State’s interests) seeking more access to 
evidence and more document production, applying the Rawlsian 
Second Principle (Difference Principle) might mean that an arbitral 
tribunal choosing to grant such requests of a non-disputing party 
could potentially try to balance the interests at stake by allocating 
the increased costs more towards the host State who does not object 
to the participation of the non-disputing party, and whose interests 
usually form the core of the non-disputing party’s participation.108  
As seen in the above discussion, the application of Rawlsian 
Fairness criteria to the charges of “unfairness” in relation to 
procedural due process concerns in international commercial 
arbitration and international investment arbitration yields mixed 
results.  At best, Rawlsian Fairness criteria make it all the more 
imperative to differentiate between the nature of consent in each 
type of arbitration, the respective expectations of the parties to the 
arbitration (as well as who the actual parties are to the arbitration), 
as well as the actual degree of control or influence each party has 
over the conduct of the arbitral proceedings.  Rawls’ theory of justice 
would not make it that easy to reach a conclusion of “unfairness” 
without acknowledging these necessary differences. 
 
 
                                                     
107  See Paul Friedland & Kate Brown de Vejar, Discoverability of Communications 
between Counsel and Party-Appointed Experts in International Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 15  160, 175 
(Albert Jan Van Den Berg ed. 2011) (“[D]ocument production tends to increase the 
cost of a case.  While document production requests could, in theory, be tailored to 
seek production of only a few specified documents, this has not been the result in 
practice.”).  Although legal counsels do have some level of control over the costs of 
the arbitration (as well as projected costs from document production), they do have 
to act expeditiously and prudently to inform their clients of the need to preserve 
documents if they anticipate the arbitration would eventually warrant document 
production.  IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration, 
Guideline 12 (May 25, 2013).  
108  See Christina L. Beharry, Objections to Requests for Documents in 
International Arbitration:  Emerging Practices from NAFTA Chapter 11, 27 ICSID REV. 
33, 33-64 (2012) (considering the growing trend in investment arbitration for more 
extensive documentary discovery and the appropriate scope of requests for 
documents). 
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2.2.2. Critique of unfairness based on the outcome of a dispute 
 
It is difficult to qualitatively assess, in general, the merits of 
charges of unfairness on the basis of the end results of international 
arbitrations.  On the one hand, one could understand the critique as 
a methodological one, where the absence of a hard or strong notion 
of “precedent” means that ad hoc arbitral tribunals constituted to 
resolve the specific particularized dispute before them decide 
without necessarily being bound by the decisions of other arbitral 
tribunals.109  (Again, the criticism is, at its core, drawn from more 
judicial or litigation-based sensibilities, where judicial precedents 
are binding across the board on all courts.)  On the other hand, the 
critique may also be one that zeroes in on the intersubjectivity of 
arbitral judging as a practice, when biases of arbitral tribunals are 
alleged to affect the eventual outcomes of disputes.110  This is 
specifically problematic for the international arbitral system that 
does not possess a clear system-wide sanctions rule on arbitrators 
who breach their duty of fairness:   
[t]he penalty for breach of an arbitrator’s duty of fairness 
carries a certain irony, in that sanctions do not fall directly 
on the arbitrator who breached his or her duty.  Although 
they may suffer a loss of reputation, offending arbitrators 
can benefit from immunity even for violations of basic 
procedural integrity.  The price of misconduct thus falls most 
directly on the prevailing party, in the form of award 
                                                     
109  See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010), at pp. 1895-1958, at pp. 1914-1949 (arguing that 
considerations relevant to the acceptance of arbitral precedent include structural 
characteristics of the specific type of arbitration, the gap-filling function of 
arbitrators, and prevailing attitudes towards arbitrators’ legitimacy as producers of 
law).  The critique is more pronounced in the perennial search for a jurisprudence 
constante in international investment arbitration.  See Christoph Schreuer & 
Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1188, 1188-1205, 1189 (Peter T. Muchlinski, 
Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
110  See generally Charlotte Knapper, Joseph M. Tirado & Rebecca Wright, 
Arbitrator Bias: An International Comparison, 4 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MGMT. art. 
no. 2 (2008); Mary E. Comeau, John J. Marshal & Andrea R. Sparkes, Six Degrees of 
Separation:  Arbitrator Independence in International Arbitration, 4 TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTE MGMT. art. no. 5 (2008).   
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annulment for breach of procedural integrity.111   
Rawlsian fairness criteria can be applied to test charge of unfairness 
in international arbitration based dispute outcomes, e.g.  absence of 
precedent and arbitrator bias. 
In regard to the first aspect of this critique – the supposed 
unfairness of the absence of ‘precedent’ in international arbitration 
– one first has to reexamine the “original position” of parties 
submitting their dispute to arbitration.  In international commercial 
arbitrations, where awards between disputing parties are frequently 
not published, and the controlling intention of the parties 
submitting the dispute is to reach an expeditious and fair resolution 
(so as not to jeopardize the unique business interests at stake and 
business relationships between the parties); it is more than likely 
that parties would not expect that their dispute could be resolved by 
adherence to some “precedent”.  By contrast, international 
arbitrations, which involve more State involvement (such as inter-
State arbitrations or investor-State arbitrations) and which 
purposely include general principles of international law as part of 
the applicable law for the dispute, could make the case for resorting 
to other international jurisprudence as evidence of custom or the 
relevant interpretive practice of international courts of international 
treaties and other similar instruments.  As former President of the 
International Court of Justice Gilbert Guillaume rightly points out, 
the value of precedent in international arbitration has to be 
differentiated according to the purposes for which the arbitration is 
organized: 
Of course, the situation is quite different in international 
arbitration. In fact, tribunals are normally constituted for 
each different arbitration, and thus lack the permanence that 
is characteristic of a jurisdiction.  Furthermore, their decisions 
are of variable quality.  What is more, not all of their decisions are 
rendered public, and hence the tribunals do not have knowledge of 
all decisions previously rendered.  Thus, for arbitrators, 
precedent plays a much lesser role than for judges.  Legal 
coherence sometimes suffers as a consequence. 
However, in certain sectors permanence and transparency 
                                                     
111  William W. Park, Procedural Tension in International Arbitration: Arbitration 
in Autumn, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND 
INNOVATIONS 3, 9  (John Norton Moore ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013). 
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are stronger than in others.  Thus the portrait is more 
complex than one might be led to believe at first sight. 
Interstate arbitration is most frequently entrusted to 
members of international tribunals (particularly from the 
International Court of Justice) or to academics who are 
familiar with these institutions.  The decisions are always 
published.  Thus, they are more frequently imprinted with 
jurisprudence from the International Court of Justice and 
arbitration tribunals on which they rely.  They can at times 
distance themselves from this jurisprudence in an attempt to 
complete it or add nuances to it.  Yet they are essentially 
faithful to the precedent that they cite abundantly. 
At the opposite extreme of the spectrum are the arbitral 
awards rendered in commercial disputes between private 
companies.  These decisions remain confidential in the vast 
majority of cases.  Arbitrators settle specific contractual 
disputes in light of the parties’ undertakings and the facts of 
the case.  Due to this double reason, they often arbitrate 
without reference to arbitral jurisprudence. 
. . . In conclusion, the arbitration tribunals presently 
reference precedent more frequently than in the past.  But the 
demand of transparency and coherence is not the same in all 
domains, or for all actors.  This demand is stronger in interstate 
relations than in commercial relations.  Dispute settlement in 
the field of investments, for its part, constitutes an 
intermediate case in which a certain progress is both possible 
and necessary.112 (emphasis added) 
Applying the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle) to 
parties concluding the arbitral agreement, if “precedent” were to be 
entrenched as a rule applicable to an international arbitration, then 
the parties should have equal liberties in regard to the approval and 
acceptance of this doctrine of precedent as part of their chosen 
design for the arbitration.  The difficulty with striving for a hard and 
fast doctrine of precedent is that this would make it a duty (much 
                                                     
112  Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and 
Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 14-15, 17-18 (2011). 
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like the magisterial duties of common-law judges113) on the part of 
arbitrators to comb through all applicable arbitral awards 
(published or unpublished) as substantive authority for their 
eventual decisions, when, outside of the bedrock of mandatory rules 
applicable to the arbitration,114 parties themselves generally choose 
the substantive law and the lex arbitrii (the law governing the 
existence and proceedings of the arbitral tribunal) as part of the core 
principle of party autonomy in international arbitration.115  Under 
the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle), this would be 
deemed fair only if the parties chose in advance to be bound by such 
a hard doctrine of precedent, such that all parties have equal 
liberties to deliberate and decide upon the inclusion of such a 
doctrine as part of the applicable law governing the arbitration. 
Assuming the parties do exercise this choice, the Rawlsian 
Second Principle (Difference Principle) would require that any 
ensuing inequalities arising from the inclusion of this doctrine be 
allocated away from the party most disadvantaged by this decision.  
Where parties agree in advance to accept a hard doctrine of 
precedent, however, an arbitral tribunal would be hard put to 
identify a party more disadvantaged than the other through the 
resort to other arbitral awards as precedent.  One could think of 
variances in party access to unpublished arbitral awards as a 
                                                     
113  See Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 215-57 (1987) (contemplating the nature of judicial 
obligation). 
114  See generally Loukas Mistelis, Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration:  
Too Much Too Early or Too Little Too Late?, in MANDATORY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION (George A. Berman & Loukas Mistelis eds., Juris Publ’g 2011).  For the 
proposal to hold arbitrators liable when they fail to comply or to ensure compliance 
with mandatory rules, see Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling 
Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1279-1334 (2000) (proposing a 
mechanism to require arbitrators to use mandatory rules). 
115  See generally ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & 
CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 76-77 (Sweet & Maxwell eds. 2004); see also Yas Banifatemi, The Law 
Applicable in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:  A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 191, 192 (Katia Yannaca-Small 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010) 
Being an arbitral process, investment treaty arbitration in no way differs 
from international commercial arbitration in that the principle of party 
autonomy is the primary rule governing the arbitration, including as 
regards the law applicable to the substance of the dispute.  When the 
applicable law has been chosen by the parties, the arbitrators have a duty 
to apply such law and nothing but such law. 
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potential source of party disadvantage that could justify the 
application of the Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference Principle).  
As a matter of fairness, if parties are consenting to expand the 
applicable law to the arbitration to include a hard doctrine of 
precedent, that consent should be mutually well-informed by 
identification of the actual universe of jurisprudence from which 
precedents could be drawn.  Lacking this form of notice or 
transparency of information to the parties, arbitrators could well be 
vulnerable to the charge of unfairness when their interpretive 
methodologies and/or discretion cause them to invoke bodies of 
jurisprudence nowhere anticipated by the parties or contemplated 
in the consent to arbitration.116 
With respect to the second aspect of the critique of unfairness 
based on dispute outcomes – e.g. arbitrator bias, which, as one 
scholar argues, does not just manifest itself with individual 
arbitrators but supposedly exists as a “systemic” matter 
characteristic of international arbitration as a whole, and not just 
from the standpoint of attitudinal, cognitive or behavioral 
conceptions of individual arbitrator bias.117  Applying Rawlsian 
fairness criteria to this particular charge of unfairness, this charge of 
unfairness based on alleged “systemic bias” would not prosper.  At 
least in the “original position” when parties decide ab initio upon the 
                                                     
116  On the illustrated dangers of “surprise” references to precedents stemming 
from an entirely separate body of law (e.g. WTO jurisprudence) without regard for 
the actual text and genealogy of an investment treaty provision, see Kathleen 
Claussen, The Casualty of Investor Protection in Times of Economic Crisis, 118 YALE L.J. 
1545, 1545-55 (2009).  I have likewise warned against the casual acceptance of trade 
law jurisprudence as entirely applicable to investment treaty interpretation to 
generate supposed public policy solutions.  Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in 
International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations and Functional 
Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 51, 117-30 (2014).  One scholar goes to the extent 
of arguing that international arbitration in and of itself is a “flawed vehicle for 
harmonizing law,” such that investment arbitral tribunals should altogether resist 
abiding by any norm of precedent or deference to earlier awards.  Irene M. Ten 
Cate, The Costs of Consistency:  Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418, 418 (2013) (“Substantive investment law, currently consisting 
of approximately three thousand instruments, is fragmented and dynamic.  And 
due to its ad hoc character, arbitration is flawed as a vehicle for harmonizing law.”). 
117  This claim turns, of course, on the author’s definition of ‘systemic’ bias.  See 
Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration:  A 
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 4 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 3, 553-85, at 
584 (2013) (explaining “ . . . the multilateral and fluid processes of selecting 
arbitrators, as well as the lack of tenured arbitrators and the lack of stare decisis 
underpin the pluralistic, diverse, and democratic potential of international 
arbitration.”). 
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arbitral agreement and the design of the arbitration, it is clear that 
parties have equal opportunities to choose the appointments 
procedure for arbitrators (as well as to select party-nominated 
arbitrators and devise procedures for selection of the independent 
arbitrator or chair of the arbitral tribunal).  Insofar as the 
appointments procedure is concerned, parties to any form of 
international arbitration (international commercial arbitration, 
inter-State arbitration, or investor-State arbitration) can avail of the 
same grounds to challenge and disqualify arbitrators for bias.118  The 
Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle) is met at the front end as 
well as the back end of the arbitration proceedings because parties 
possess the same liberties and opportunities not just within the 
processes of arbitrator selection but also in the processes available 
for arbitrator disqualification – even up to the potential to seek 
denial of recognition and/or enforcement of arbitral awards that are 
tainted by arbitrator bias, serious arbitrator misconduct, or 
irregularity in the proceedings.119  The Rawlsian Second Principle 
(Difference Principle) is likewise met because any inequalities 
ensuing from the parties’ appointment of arbitrators are allocated 
away from the party that stands to be most disadvantaged from the 
appointment of the offending arbitrator – that party is purposely 
given the right of recourse to challenge and disqualification 
procedures, if not further opportunities to prevent enforcement and 
recognition of arbitral awards issued under manifest arbitrator bias.  
At the very least, from the standpoint of Rawls’ theory of justice, it 
is difficult to identify what the actual critique of “unfairness” is 
stemming from the consensual nature of arbitrator appointments as 
a whole, and the various modes by which parties can regulate the 
conduct of arbitrators as they could or would tend to affect their 
disputes.  Lacking a clear nexus between the supposedly pervasive 
“systemic bias” (one might also say that this eventuality is expected 
by parties voluntarily submitting their disputes to arbitration) 
inherent in international arbitration and the actual dispute outcomes 
                                                     
118  See SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR A ‘REAL DANGER’ TEST 1-28 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009) (on 
bias challenges and arbitrator appointment procedure in international commercial 
arbitration); id. at 211-48 (on bias challenges and arbitrator appointment procedure 
in investor-State arbitration). 
119  See United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, 
N.Y., U.S., 1958, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards, Art. V (outlining how a party may refuse recognition and enforcement of 
an award invoked against it); ICSID Convention, Art. 52. 
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allegedly ensuing from this bias,120 a generalized and nebulous 
charge of ‘unfairness’ cannot be readily admitted. 
 
2.2.3. Critique of unfairness for lack of a sufficient appeals 
mechanism 
 
International arbitration exists through judicial support and 
some limited degree of court supervision.121  Its design is such that 
                                                     
120  One need not look further than the debate over this particular question in 
investor-State arbitration, where scholars have viscerally clashed on whether 
arbitral tribunals are pro-investor or pro-host State.  See Susan Franck, Development 
and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 487 (2009) 
(finding that “at a general level, the outcome of investment treaty arbitration was 
not reliably associated with the development status of the respondent state, the 
development status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interaction between those 
two variables.”); Van Harten, supra note 39 at 252. 
First, in the context of arbitrator resolutions of contested jurisdictional 
issues, there is tentative support for expectations of systemic bias arising 
from the interests of arbitrators in light of the system’s asymmetrical 
claims structure and the absence of conventional markers of judicial 
independence.  Second, the results of this study suggest a need for further 
scrutiny and evaluation of the design and performance of investment 
treaty arbitration.  Third, based on legal doctrine and comparative 
institutional analysis, there is reason to take a cautious approach to the 
risk of actual bias in an adjudicative system of public importance by 
adopting institutional safeguards to reduce any reasonably perceived bias 
arising from the system’s structure or performance. 
121  See Jan Paulsson, Why Good Arbitration Cannot Compensate for Bad Courts – 
Freshfields Hong Kong University Arbitration Lecture, 30 J. INT’L ARB. 344, 349-50 
(2013). 
Is the objective therefore above all to quell judicial tendencies to assert 
dominance?  Is this a zero-sum game, where every successful assertion of 
arbitral jurisdiction is a victory, and every instance of judicial 
predominance to be deplored?  The answer is emphatically negative.  
There is nothing inherently superior about the activity of arbitrators.  To 
the contrary, in an ideal world public justice would be of such a quality, 
in terms of fairness, insight and empathy, that the allure of arbitration 
would vanish.  That ideal is impossibly remote, so arbitration remains 
attractive.  Yet arbitration unchecked inevitably means arbitration abused. 
Ultimate freedom is not the goal.  An arbitration-friendly venue is not the 
one where awards are totally inviolate; that rather indicates a degree of 
indifference that invites abuse.  Yet there is such a thing as good 
annulments of awards.  Before railing against interventionist courts, one 
would do well to consider the perceived deficiencies of arbitral 
performance. 
. . . Whatever the quality of their comprehension of the arbitral process, 
judges are naturally sensitive to a number of principles which should 
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the efficacy of international arbitration also depends, to a significant 
extent, on the systems of public justice available through the courts.  
Courts decide various pressing questions to international 
arbitration:  whether they should refer a dispute to arbitration on the 
basis of prior agreement by the parties; whether they should issue 
orders to give effect to the procedural orders or provisional 
measures issued by arbitral tribunals; as well as whether they 
should recognize and enforce an arbitral award within their 
respective jurisdictions.122  In deciding whether to extend 
recognition and order enforcement of an arbitral award, courts do 
not generally conduct appellate review or review de novo of the legal 
issues on the merits.123  The principle of finality of arbitral awards 
                                                     
facilitate their interaction with arbitrators.  There is, for example, broad 
agreement with the proposition that an essential feature of human rights, 
and thus the assigned objective of judges and arbitrators alike, is the right 
to a fair trial.  Unfortunately, dictators and bureaucrats are prone to turn 
this principle on its head, invoking it as an excuse to impose their justice 
(the only fair one) to the exclusion of all others.  This is in reality their own 
project of entrenchment; it has nothing to do with the aspiration of 
affording acceptable justice to all.  The fortunate countries that in fact 
succeed in delivering decent justice to their populace at large are, if we 
look around, precisely the ones which at the same time embrace 
arbitration. 
Why is it that the places where public justice has the weakest grip also 
tend to be those where arbitration is most fiercely resisted by the courts?  
The plausible answers are dismaying – incompetence, xenophobia, 
corruption – and should warn us that arbitration cannot flourish when the 
courts are substandard.  To escape from courts would be to seek islands, 
unique self-contained environments which may be of use to the happy 
few, but are incapable of a broader reach. 
Systems that deliver poor formal justice have no right to close the door to 
arbitration.  Equally, when a particular form of arbitration proves 
defective, it has no title to claim immunity from challenge and control; 
arbitrators have no greater entitlement to their office than do dictators or 
bureaucrats.  Whether those who resolve disputes are appointed by the 
state or chosen by the parties, both categories have the duty to pursue the 
same objective: decent justice as a right of those who come before them. In 
a good legal culture, each is respectable and respected.  The ideal is 
symbiosis of two types of decision-makers who ultimately pursue the 
same end. 
122  HANS SMIT & V. PECHOTA, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND 
THE COURTS at A1-A9 (Juris Publ’g 4th ed. 2004). 
123  1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards.  See also, Herbert S. Kronke, The New York Convention Fifty Years On:  An 
Overview and Assessment, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1, 8 (Herbert 
Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk Otto & Nicola Christine Port eds., Kluwer Law 
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extends from the fundamental principle of party autonomy in 
international arbitration.124 
Notably, the charge of ‘unfairness’ arising from the lack of a 
satisfactory and sufficient appeals mechanism (similar to the notion 
of multiple stages of appellate review in national courts) resonates 
more in investor-State arbitration than in international commercial 
arbitration.125  Article 52 of the ICSID Convention only refers to 
limited procedural grounds for annulment of an arbitral award by 
an ICSID ad hoc committee constituted for the purpose, and does 
not permit any appellate review on the merits.126  Those who have 
sought a more extensive appeals mechanism in investor-State 
arbitration point to the need for jurisprudential coherence and 
consistency (if not aiming for predictable uniformity) between 
investment arbitral tribunals, often citing the experience of the WTO 
Appellate Body, but also noting fundamental differences between 
WTO and ICSID processes.127  Opponents of the proposal for WTO-
like appeals mechanisms in the ICSID system point to the proposal’s 
lack of legitimacy, inappropriateness for the institutional and 
structural context of investor-State dispute settlement, and 
incompatibility with the expectations of States signing on to the 
ICSID Convention.128 
                                                     
Int’l 2010) (“The trend in modern law is to reduce the grounds on which national 
courts can review arbitral awards in international commercial arbitrations.”). 
124  See Clive M. Schmitthoff, Finality of arbitral awards and judicial review, in 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 230, 230-31 (Julian D.M. 
Lew ed., Ctr. for Commercial Law Studies 1987) (addressing the inherent tension 
between arbitration’s desirable finality and the lacking need for judicial review). 
125  See generally Rivkin, supra note 12, at 357-59; Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate 
System in International Investment Arbitration?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1154, 1168-169 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino 
& Christoph Schreuer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
126  ICSID Convention, Article 52.  
127  See Donald McRae, The WTO Appellate Body:  A Model for an ICSID Appeals 
Facility?, 1 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 2, 371-87 (2010) (“[T]he Appellate Body deals 
with a system of agreements that are interrelated and not with a series of separate 
agreements involving different parties.”);  Theodore R. Posner, An Appellate 
Mechanism for Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Perspective Based on the WTO 
Appellate Body Experience, (Crowell Moring LLP, Working Paper), 
http://www.crowell.com/documents/An-Appellate-Mechanism-for-Investor-
State-Dispute-Settlement.pdf. 
128  See Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards:  Is the Desire for 
Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 444, 462 (2006) 
(explaining how the Contracting States’ decision against the ICSID’s decisions was 
not surprising); Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for 
Investment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
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It is difficult to sustain the critique of unfairness when one 
applies Rawlsian fairness criteria.  Indeed, in the “original position” 
when States signed, concluded, and acceded to the ICSID 
Convention which created a “self-contained system,”129 access to a 
centralized appellate mechanism was not part of the States’ 
expectations of terms and benefits under the ICSID Convention.  For 
decades, States have been devising their respective investment 
treaty programs without reference to any centralized appellate 
mechanism, and without stipulating that arbitral awards were 
reviewable through an appeal on the merits in some court, tribunal, 
or other institution.  Applying the Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty 
Principle), all States signing on to the ICSID Convention possess 
equal liberties to indicate the terms of their accession (as well as any 
reservations) to the ICSID system.  Applying the Rawlsian Second 
Principle (Difference Principle), because States accepted the 
applicability of ICSID procedures as such a self-contained system 
(including its limited grounds for annulment of arbitral awards 
under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention), then any inequality that 
could supposedly arise from this system is not, by any stretch, 
                                                     
231 (Karl Sauvant ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2008); Christian J. Tams, An Appealing 
Option? The Debate About an ICSID Appellate Structure, Essays in Transnational 
Economic Law No. 57 41-42 (2006), available at http://www.telc.uni-
halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft57.pdf (last accessed 15 Jan. 2014) 
The strongest argument supporting the creation of an appellate system is 
the hope a reform of the system would be more coherent.  Unfortunately, 
however, this argument presupposes the creation of a specific form of 
appellate institution, which is most difficult to agree on, namely a single, 
comprehensive, and permanent appeals mechanism.  The consistency 
argument thus requires a considerable degree of political will.  In contrast, 
other arguments put forward by supporters of reform are of a much lesser 
value.  It may be that an appeals system could render ICSID dispute 
settlement more rational; but this hope has to be balanced against the 
certain prospects of longer and more expensive proceedings.  Much then 
suggests that the initial approach, adopted by the ICSID drafters, should 
not be lightly discarded, especially since the ICSID record testifies to its 
popularity.  It may also be that an appeals system would increase the 
authority of ICSID decisions.  But that in itself does not seem to justify a 
reform, as ICSID decisions already enjoy much authority, and there are no 
real compliance problems.  Lastly, introducing an appeals facility would 
be clearly an inappropriate way of rendering ICSID dispute settlement 
more State-friendly.  On balance, there are therefore no compelling 
reasons to create an appellate investment structure.  The present system is 
not perfect.  But it should be given time to work out pragmatic solutions 
to the problem of inconsistent decisions . . . 
129  CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION:  A COMMENTARY 1102 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
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“imposed” upon any State that deems itself disadvantaged by the 
system.  Rather, States themselves voluntarily assume any such 
ensuing inequality across the board. 
Since the critique of unfairness on this ground of appeals 
mechanisms is based on a priori conceptions of a more extensive or 
judicialized paradigm, one has to scrutinize the extent to which an 
expectation of review de novo is in accord with what States 
contemplate in designing the investor-State arbitration.  There is 
nothing that supports a preconceived scope of an appeals 
mechanism as somehow directly proportional to one’s conception of 
fairness — this is, at its core, a design preference of parties to the 
international arbitration as is the matter of the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, the substantive choice of law, as well as the 
applicable lex arbitrii.  That ICSID does not have an appellate 
mechanism calling for review de novo of ICSID arbitral awards is 
certainly a given fact — but that this situation somehow is 
intrinsically “unfair” remains an unproven proposition.  At the very 
least, where reasonable terms of negotiation are transparently and 
evenly applied to all parties in the “original position,” and all parties 
possess equal liberties in deciding whether or not to accede to the 
ICSID Convention, including accepting in advance the eventuality 
that there would be only narrow procedural due process grounds 
for annulling ICSID arbitral awards, it cannot be said, at least under 
Rawlsian fairness criteria, that any such “unfairness” has occurred. 
Of course, the normative choice of whether investor-State 
arbitration should have a centralized appellate mechanism could itself be 
a separate question for the application of Rawlsian fairness criteria.  
If this were the question forming the basis of the critique of 
unfairness, then one would have to look to the original position of 
States designing investor-State arbitration as modes of dispute 
settlement within their international investment treaties.130  Do 
States genuinely negotiate on “reasonable terms” in this situation, 
and do all States concluding these agreements (especially in the 
                                                     
130  The history behind the negotiation of various generations of international 
investment agreements is a complex tapestry of multiple interests in play.  See 
KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, 
INTERPRETATION 19–74 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (recounting the development of 
international law in treaties, beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia); see also 
JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE THREE LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT: NATIONAL, 
CONTRACTUAL, AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL 331–62 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2013) (discussing the “treatification” of international law and 
investment). 
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usual case of bilateral negotiations) possess the same liberties during 
the bargaining process?  To the extent that it is shown that some 
States have more bargaining leverage than others131 especially in 
investment agreements,132 it is clear that the Rawlsian First Principle 
(Liberty Principle) would not be met.  In such a case where 
inequalities could ensue from this form of dispute settlement (sans 
appeal on the merits) being “crammed down” upon States with less 
bargaining capacity,133 the Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference 
Principle) would thus favor designing a solution that allocates the 
inequality away from the disadvantaged State.  Perhaps a solution 
at the front end of the process would be to place more conditions or 
requirements before the more advantaged party (whether the State 
with leverage or its nationals) could trigger or invoke the dispute 
settlement mechanism against the State with less bargaining 
leverage.  A solution at the back end of the process would, 
inevitably, have to mean redesigning the dispute settlement system 
somewhat to permit the State with less leverage to have some form 
of review over the arbitral tribunal’s decisions.  That is unlikely to 
occur in bilateral negotiations where one party already has leverage 
unless more training is given to negotiators from the disadvantaged 
State (or developing countries, which are usually the recipients of a 
                                                     
131  See, e.g., DIANA PANKE, UNEQUAL ACTORS IN EQUALISING INSTITUTIONS:  
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 51 (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013) (discussing the typical bargaining dynamics that exist in the U.N. and the 
relation between a State’s bargaining leverage and its bargaining success rate). 
132  JOSE E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 196 (Hague Acad. of Int’l Law 2011). 
133  Somewhat analogous to the “doctrine of unequal treaties” theorized some 
years ago regarding investment treaties.  See  M. Sornarajah, Compensation for 
Nationalization:  The provision in the European Energy Charter, in THE ENERGY CHARTER 
TREATY: AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE 386, 400 (Thomas W. 
Walde ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 1996).  
Some writers have pointed out that the bilateral investment treaties are, 
by nature, unequal treaties.  One writer described them as a “one-way 
ratchet designed to benefit multinationals.”  Another has referred to the 
“asymmetry between the parties” to such treaties.  Though not directly 
made, the charge is that these treaties involve an inequality which may 
invoke the application of the theory of unequal treaties.  There is a 
dominant capital exporter and a weak capital recipient in the making of 
such treaties.  The treaty is made on the assumption that capital inflows 
into the receiving State will benefit its economy.  Though they are made 
on the express statement that they are intended to cover bilateral flows of 
foreign investment, the reality is that they are only a one-way flow of 
investments . . . .  [T]he theory invalidates obligations created by unequal 
treaties.  
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developed country model investment treaty).134  Ultimately, that 
kind of redesign would entail going back to the negotiation table to 
create some kind of ‘bespoke[n]’ investor-State arbitration that 
allows States to decide on opportunities for appeal to disadvantaged 
parties.  Reinventing the wheel in that manner, however, will pose 
its own form of costs to States.  For this article’s narrow purpose of 
testing the critique of unfairness for lack of an appeals mechanism 
under Rawlsian fairness criteria, however, it is unnecessary at this 
juncture to address the deeper systemic structural design dilemma 
in international investment arbitration. 
 
2.2.4. Critique of unfairness based on community decision-making 
and the public interest 
 
Finally, the most viscerally contested charges of unfairness 
against international arbitration lie with the supposedly “elitist” 
composition of the international community of arbitrators,135 and 
                                                     
134  J. ANTHONY VANDUZER, PENELOPE SIMONS & GRAHAM MAYEDA, 
INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS:  A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS 3 (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2013) (“Inequalities between developed and developing countries are 
more easily exploited when negotiations are based on a pre-existing IIA model 
drafted by developed countries with only their interests in mind.”). 
135  See Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 5, 19 (1997) 
(discussing exchanges on the merits and demerits of an “arbitral elite”). 
Given the high stakes and great sensitivities frequently involved in 
arbitration, there seems to be a good case for supporting the emergence 
and recognition of an elite corps of international arbitrators.  Here the 
notion of an elite is that of a meritocracy in terms of legal skill, honesty 
and experience. Of course such a thing cannot be a Pantheon of immortals, 
and it would be intolerable if it were a closed shop by any standard (of 
culture, gender or nationality).  Properly understood, this notion turns 
back complaints about a self-perpetuating clique of international 
arbitrators who appoint and reappoint each other, and instead tends to the 
conclusion that the establishment of an elite corps is a good thing.  The 
mutual recognition of its members does not reflect an unsavoury system 
of quid pro quo, rather it builds the confidence of all participants in the 
process.  More or less jocular (or perhaps wistful) references to an 
international arbitration “mafia” not only lack a solid evidentiary basis, 
but in fact do not seem to reflect any probing reflection.  The proposition 
is that there are a few dozen well-known arbitrators who see to it that 
outsiders are kept out.  However, arbitral institutions, on the one hand, 
and the parties and their lawyers, on the other, have a far greater say in 
who gets appointed than do arbitrators. 
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the aptitude and competence of this “elite” to properly resolve 
issues of public interest when they arise in international arbitration 
disputes.136  This critique particularly arises in the context of 
international investment arbitration, where the public interest 
consequences of arbitral decisions have been most vividly (and 
repeatedly) depicted as nothing short of a “legitimacy crisis.”137 
From the standpoint of Rawlsian fairness criteria, it is crucial to 
revisit the “original position” of States agreeing to the design of 
investor-State arbitration, particularly with respect to anticipated 
uses (or misuses) of the appointments procedures for arbitrators.  
When States negotiate to provide for investor-State dispute 
settlement within their investment treaties (whether ICSID or non-
ICSID arbitration), were there reasonable terms of negotiation in 
regard to what States anticipate could be the composition of 
investment arbitral tribunals?  Under the ICSID Convention, the 
                                                     
 See also Lord David Hacking, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response, What Happens if 
the Icelandic Arbitrator Falls through the Ice?, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 73, 74–75 (1998).  
 . . . [W]henever there are groupings of professional people there is always 
a tendency for that group to be kept small and exclusive; and, whether the 
members of the group wish it or not (many do not), the work tends to 
remain within that group rather than go outside it . . . .  However there are 
disadvantages.  Any grouping of professionals which becomes exclusive 
will tend to operate (intentionally and unintentionally) against the arrival 
of new persons into their ranks—in the case of arbitration against the 
arrival into the ranks of new arbitrators hopefully with new ideas and 
fresh approaches.  Ultimately this will limit the choice of the consumer in 
obtaining arbitral services. 
136  See generally Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration 
in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT (Albert Jan 
van den Berg ed., 2002) available at www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/article.asp?key=36; see also Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public 
Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the 
Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008) (discussing the issue of a 
lack of public participation in international arbitration); see also Alexander 
Belohlavek, Confidentiality and Publicity in Investment Arbitration, Public Interest and 
Scope of Powers Vested in Arbitral Tribunals, 2 CZECH YEARBOOK INT’L L., 23, 23-45 
(2011) (analyzing the effect of globalization on regulatory schemes). 
137  Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:  
Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1521, 1521-1625 (2005); see also Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and 
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 45–94 (2013) 
(describing the incoherence of international law and investment policy); see also 
Amokura Kawharu, Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in Investment 
Arbitrations as Amici Curiae, 275, 283–85 in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT AND 
ARBITRATION:  PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) 
(discussing the importance of involvement of amicus curiae in investment 
arbitration). 
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Contracting States themselves each designate up to four persons to 
the Panel of Arbitrators (the list from which arbitrators for investor-
State disputes at ICSID are drawn) with the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council (or the President of the World Bank who is 
ex officio Chairman) permitted to designate up to ten more persons 
in the Panel of Arbitrators,138 paying due regard to “the importance 
of assuring representation on the Panels of the principal legal 
systems of the world and of the main forms of economic activity.”139  
States (as well as the President of the World Bank) can only 
designate “persons of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who 
may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment, [where] 
competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in 
the case of persons on the Panel of Arbitrators.”140 
Thus, at the outset, it should be clear that the universe of 
arbitrators available for investor-State arbitration under the ICSID 
system is already delimited and made subject to the ex ante 
preferences of the Contracting States to the ICSID Convention under 
strict criteria.  The importance of this representative selection 
process under strict criteria for ICSID arbitrators was evident early 
on in the history of the drafting of the ICSID Convention, where it 
was even contemplated that to help the Contracting States in 
making their designations to the Panel of Arbitrators, they would be 
required first to “seek such advice as they may deem appropriate 
from their highest courts of justice, schools of law, bar associations 
and such commercial, industrial and financial organizations and 
shall be considered representative of the professions they 
embrace.”141  (This requirement, however, did not make it to the 
final language adopted for the ICSID Convention).  Considering that 
the Contracting States themselves designate the arbitrators that 
would govern the system of ICSID arbitration under uniform 
criteria for all designations, there is some basis for concluding that 
at least, in the sense of the Rawlsian ‘original position’, Contracting 
                                                     
138  ICSID Convention, Art. 13. 
139  Id. at Art. 14(2). 
140  Id. at Art. 14(1). 
141  ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 27–37 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) 
(quote sourced as footnote 39 in the main text).  There are of course other narratives 
asserted pertaining to the public-private dichotomy inherent in investment law.  See 
Alex Mills, Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International 
Investment Law and Arbitration, 14 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 469, 471–76 (2011) (addressing 
the indeterminacy of public international law). 
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States themselves set reasonable conditions for bargaining (e.g., the 
constitution of arbitral tribunals for future investor-State disputes). 
The Rawlsian First Principle (Liberty Principle) is also met by the 
fact that parties to the investor-State dispute possess equal or the 
same liberties in regard to the appointment of arbitrators and 
challenges to the qualification of arbitrators.  Parties to the investor-
State dispute agree on the number of arbitrators to comprise the 
tribunal,142 with a procedure for the Chairman of the Administrative 
Council to appoint arbitrators if the Tribunal shall not have been 
constituted within 90 days after dispatch of the notice of registration 
of the request for arbitration.143  Parties may choose to appoint 
arbitrators outside of the ICSID’s Panel of Arbitrators, so long as 
they meet the same criteria as those required for individuals 
designated to the Panel of Arbitrators.144  Any party to the 
arbitration can move to disqualify an arbitrator in the tribunal if 
there is a “manifest lack” of the qualities required under Article 
14(1) of the ICSID Convention.145  The Rawlsian Second Principle 
(Difference Principle) is also met in this situation, because any 
ensuing inequality from the Contracting States’ designation of 
arbitrators to the Panel of Arbitrators could be mitigated (or 
allocated away from the most disadvantaged States) by the 
Chairman’s ability to designate other arbitrators to ensure the 
genuine representativeness of the Panel in reflecting all principal 
legal systems as well as forms of economic activity.  If parties cannot 
agree on the constitution of the tribunal within the above-mentioned 
ninety-day period, the Chairman likewise has the ability (and in 
consultation with both parties as much as possible) to appoint the 
remaining arbitrator.  Thus, at least from a structural perspective 
and to the extent that any potential inequality could arise from the 
creation of the Panel of Arbitrators, the appointment of arbitrators 
to tribunals in future investor-State disputes, and the 
disqualification of arbitrators unable to abide by the same criteria 
required under Article 14(1) of the ICSID Convention, the most 
disadvantaged party (State or investor) would not bear the impact 
of that inequality. 
The same Rawlsian fairness criteria may likewise be used to test 
the veracity of the charge of unfairness due to the supposed inability 
                                                     
142  ICSID Convention, Art. 37. 
143  Id. at Art. 38. 
144  Id. at Art. 40. 
145  Id. at Art. 57, 58. 
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of ICSID arbitrators to contend with the public interest dimensions 
of investor-State disputes.  As previously discussed, in the “original 
position” of acceding to or negotiating with respect to the terms of 
accession to the ICSID Convention, it cannot be said that none of the 
Contracting States were unaware of the public interests attaching to 
investor-State disputes.  If at all, the detailed history behind the 
drafting of the ICSID Convention affirms that particular solicitude 
and interest on the part of the World Bank as well as the Contracting 
States (both developed and developing),146 leading the drafters of 
the ICSID Convention to decide on imposing restrictions to the 
usual broad scope of party autonomy found in international 
commercial arbitration.  By pre-specifying the list of potential 
arbitrators, as well as subjecting individuals continuously to the 
highest professional criteria before they could be appointed and 
serve as arbitrators in investor-State disputes, the ICSID Convention 
was evidently intended at the outset to differentiate and distinguish 
the pool of arbitrators for this form of arbitration from the usual 
forms of commercial arbitration.  If there is, thus, any trouble with 
the supposed lack of aptitude147 of particular ICSID arbitrators for 
appreciating the public interest dimensions inevitable in investor-
State arbitration, the lens of scrutiny must be redirected towards the 
way the Contracting States are making their designations to the 
ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, as well as how parties themselves (both 
the private investor as well as the presumably public-interest driven 
host State) are appointing their arbitrators and constituting the 
arbitral tribunal to govern their particular dispute.  With respect to 
that particular selection process, the Rawlsian First Principle 
(Liberty Principle) would require the broadest possible consultation 
and transparent vetting procedures by Contracting States before 
they designate arbitrators to the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators, so much 
so that all parties that do have a stake in the public interest 
dimensions inherent in investor-State arbitrations (such as non-
governmental organizations and citizens groups, among others) 
could also weigh in on the choice of arbitrators long before investor-
                                                     
146  PARRA, supra note 141, at 27–94;  see ICSID, Arbitration Rules 1–9 (discussing 
the procedure for international investment disputes). 
147  It should be noted that this particular criticism has arisen in regard to 
specific investor-State arbitrations such as the arbitrations involving the measures 
taken by Argentina in its 2000–01 financial crisis.  See Ian H. Eliasoph, A Missing 
Link:  International Arbitration and the Ability of Private Actors to Enforce Human Rights 
Norms, 10 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 83–120 (2004) (describing the importance 
of private actors in public international law enforcement). 
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State disputes arise.  Additionally, host States choosing to appoint 
arbitrators outside of the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators for specific 
investor-State disputes should likewise be responsible for 
consulting all interest groups and constituencies in their respective 
jurisdictions, especially those who would most stand to be affected 
by the arbitration.  The Rawlsian Second Principle (Difference 
Principle) would then require that any inequality ensuing from the 
Contracting State’s designation of arbitrators to the ICSID Panel 
should be allocated away from whichever group or party is most 
disadvantaged by the selection process—at the very least, that party 
should not be prejudiced in the future by the State’s appointment of 
that arbitrator.  If the protection of the public interest148 means that 
arbitral tribunals for investor-State disputes can only be deemed 
“fair” if arbitrators have a proven capacity and track record to 
adjudicate public interest issues imbuing investor-State disputes, 
then it is up to the Contracting States to police the composition of 
the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators and the appointment of arbitrators, 
as well as the continuing criteria to serve as an ICSID arbitrator, to 
conform to this specific expectation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
148  “Public interest” is such a broad political concept, which, as I have pointed 
out in other works, could just as easily be served by the economic development 
benefits and gains from investment as well as other human rights interests.  See 
Diane A. Desierto, Conflict of Treaties, Interpretation, and Decision-Making on Human 
Rights and Investment in Economic Crises, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT (2013) 
(discussing the conflict of human rights and investments during economic crises); 
Diane A. Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights and Investment in Economic Emergencies:  
Prospects of Treaty and Valuation Defenses, 9 MANCHESTER J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 162 
(2012) (describing the importance of maintaining the sanctity of human rights 
during economic crises). 
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3. CONCLUSION 
 
Admittedly, fairness is a strange thing: most people will 
share a sense of what is fair and unfair, yet a meaningful 
definition will be hard to come up with . . . most definitions 
of fairness entail three characteristics: Fairness relates to 
procedural questions. It concerns the proportionality of ends 
and means, and it goes to the roots of social interaction in a 
community.149 
It is all too easy to fault international arbitration as “unfair” for 
not having attributes one expects in a more judicial system of 
dispute resolution.  It is also just as easy to regard international 
arbitration as somehow intrinsically or systemically unfair, when 
one proceeds from an a priori conception of what a perfectly fair 
mode of dispute resolution is.  This kind of critique is very much 
Platonic150 — because somehow there is a “perfect” conception 
stemming from the vantage point of the critic, where it becomes 
altogether acceptable to charge international arbitration as “unfair” 
when it is perceived deficient in any way from that “perfect” 
conception. 
This Article was written to reset and recalibrate our critiques of 
“fairness” or “unfairness” that may or may not pervade 
international arbitration.  Rawls’ Fairness as Justice criteria provide 
a useful theoretical prism for reflecting on the cacophony of 
critiques now associated with various communities seeking the 
reform (and for some, the outright abolition151) of international 
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution for certain disputes, 
towards a more judicialized or court litigation-based paradigm.  It 
may be the case, as shown in various aspects of this Article, that the 
current design of international arbitration yields unfairness with 
respect to certain issues, and perhaps not in others.  But what is 
                                                     
149  WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER ET AL., FAIR ECONOMY: CRISIS, CULTURE, 
COMPETITION AND THE ROLE OF LAW 72 (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013) 
(describing general fairness principles). 
150  See Plato’s allegory of the cave in PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BOOK VII (G. R. F. 
Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000)(on shadows and 
realities in education). 
151  See Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, OSGOODE HALL 
LAW SCHOOL, (Jan. 15, 2014) http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/ 
documents/Public_Statement_(final)_(Dec_2013).pdf (discussing the importance 
of protecting international investors). 
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crucial is to invite a debate on our conceptions of fairness and what 
our metric really is for reaching a conclusion of unfairness.  The 
genius of John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is that he 
anticipated our social arrangements are as much a product of the 
shared equality of parties in deliberative decision-making processes, 
as they are in the distribution of inequalities away from inevitably 
disadvantaged parties.  International arbitration, after all, is yet 
another social and sociological arrangement that can likewise be 
shaped under justice as fairness. 
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